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ABSTRACT
In the Shadows of Dominion:
Anthropocentrism and the Continuance of a Culture of Oppression
by
Christopher Shields

The oppression of nonhuman animals in Western culture observed in societal institutions and
practices such as the factory farm, hunting, and vivisection, exhibits alarming linkages and
parallels to some episodes of the oppression of human animals. This work traces the foundations
of anthropocentrism in Western philosophy and connects them to the oppressions of racism,
sexism, and ethnocentrism. In outlining a uniform theory of oppression detailed through the
marginalization, isolation, and exploitation of human and nonhuman animals alike, parallels
among the groups emerge as the fused oppression of each exhibits a commonality among them.
The analysis conducted within this work highlights the development and sustainment of
oppression in the West and illuminates the socio-historical tendencies apparent in the oppression
of human and nonhuman animals alike.
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never claim to be an enlightened and free people until this senseless mass murder is stopped and
those hidden in the shadows are brought once and for all into the light.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Here I am! Here I am! Where are you?
-Michael Daly, Topsy

The lament of oppressed humans and other animals has echoed across time, rarely heard
and even less often acknowledged. Within the immense sphere of human and animal oppression,
the life and death of an elephant named Topsy is one example of the repercussions of human
dominion. Her story has become ingrained in the history and folklore of American culture, not
for how she lived but for the manner in which she died. Ironically, the giant mammal was named
after a fictive young slave girl torn from her mother at a very young age, as depicted in Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 1 Much like her namesake, Topsy the elephant came to the
United States and lived under the stringency of oppression. She was taken from her mother and
home in an Asian jungle, loaded on a ship and brought to America, where she was enslaved by
showmen and forced to perform in the Forepaugh Circus for nearly three decades. 2 Her life
consisted of continual abuse; she was mercilessly beaten, cut, and burned by her masters.
Topsy’s rise to historical notoriety began after she killed one of her handlers who had tried to
feed the normally docile animal a lit cigarette. 3 The episode would forever bind one of the
country’s innovative giants, Thomas Edison, with the three-ton animal in a spectacle that would
transcend the time.

1

Michael Daly, Topsy: The Startling Story of the Crooked Tail Elephant, P.T. Barnum, and the American Wizard,
Thomas Edison (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2013), 16-17.
2
Ibid., 10.
3
“Coney Elephant Killed,” The New York Times, January 5, 1903.
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The final act of oppression against the elephant ultimately would be in taking her life, but
the means by which it was achieved forever set the story of Topsy within American lore. A
January 5, 1903, New York Times article titled, “Coney Elephant Killed,” chronicled the
elephant’s execution. Over 1,500 spectators arrived at Coney Island to witness Topsy’s death. 4
The means to end the animal’s life consisted of administering her carrots laced with potassium
cyanide followed by an electrocution performed by employees of the Thomas Edison Company,
there to showcase the power of human innovation. 5 In an excerpt from his book Topsy, Michael
Daly details the events of the January 4, 1903, public execution of the gentle giant:

Topsy was chained by all four feet to construction pilings so she would be kept in place
even if she now decided to move. A noose was looped around her neck and attached to
the donkey engine. The wires were dragged over. Topsy immediately complied when she
was instructed to raise her right foot for the first death sandal. “Not so vicious,” a
reporter remarked aloud. Topsy seemed less a wild animal than a mild one. Another
reporter later wrote, “She stood still in the application as quietly as could be asked,
obeying all commands of the men even when telling her to get down on her knees.”
After the second electrode was fitted on her rear left foot and she was again standing,
Topsy did become mildly bothered. She shook off the electrode on her forefoot, but soon
it was secured again and there she stood, nearly three decades after being torn from her
mother and smuggled into America, where she had traveled tens of thousands of miles in
perpetual servitude, endured innumerable beatings, and survived more than a dozen train
wrecks. Her big dark eyes with their extravagant elephantine lashes glimmered with what
a reporter discerned to be still at her core. 6
Daly continues,
The camera was running and recorded Topsy again trying to shake off the electrode on
her right forefoot. The electrode stayed in place. She set her foot back down and was
standing motionless when the 6,600 volts coursed through the wires and the electrician,
Thomas, closed the switch at the park. There were flashes and small blue flames and then
smoke began to curl up from where copper met foot. Some would describe the smell as
that of burning flesh, others that of burning hoof. The pain must have been excruciating
4

“Coney Elephant Killed,” The New York Times, January 5, 1903.
Ibid.
6
Daly, 323-325.
5

8

and her huge form shook violently. . . The smoke rose up around her flanks and she
pitched forward into it, tipping to the right as her right foreleg buckled. The chain on her
left leg grew taut with the fall, restraining her even in her last instant, drawing the limb
straight out, displaying the electrode at the bottom of the foot. . .The many witnesses to
the electrocution concurred that Topsy had died without making a sound. There is no way
of knowing if, in those final instants, she had made one of those cries below the level of
human hearing, which a scientist of the next millennium would term a contact call and
explain as a simple message elephants in the wild send to other elephants across great
distances of savannah and jungle. Such a cry would have carried past the gawkers and
across the grounds and the beach beyond and out over the sea, fading to an unheard
whisper over the waves.
Here I am! Here I am! Where are you? 7

Less than a quarter century before Topsy’s arrival in New York Harbor, alone and afraid, the
hushed voices of black slaves still reverberated throughout America’s southland. They, too,
were forced into servitude, their bodies beaten and abused by their masters, denied the basic
rights now afforded to most human beings, and their cries, like those of the broken elephant,
were hidden away in the shadows of dominion: “Here I am! Here I am! Where are you?” 8

7

Daly, 323-325.
In his book Critical Regionalism: Connecting Politics and Culture in the American Landscape (University of North
Carolina Press, 2007), Douglas Reichert Powell details a similar incident regarding the public execution of another
female elephant. The elephant’s name was Mary and she was hanged to death on a crane in a railroad repair
facility in Erwin, Tennessee, just over a decade after the electrocution of Topsy. Mary, who was part of the Sparks
Circus during a fall 1916 tour through the South, killed her trainer Walter Eldridge after he struck her on the head
after she paused to pick up a watermelon rind on a parade route in Kingsport, Tennessee. Following the trainer's
death, an angry crowd, reminiscent of the lynch mobs of the time, demanded that “Murderous Mary” be killed on
the spot. Attempts to shoot the large African elephant failed, and the Sparks Circus moved to its next stop in Erwin,
the home of the Carolina, Clinchfield, and Ohio Railway repair facility. With equipment capable of exterminating
the giant mammal, the town would stand as Mary’s final stop. According to Powell, “Surely the value of the
spectacle was not lost on Charlie Sparks [circus proprietor], who had the elephants paraded out to the rail yard in
between the matinee and the evening performances, whereupon Mary was strung up from the crane on a 7/8’’
chain.” The first attempt resulted in the chain around Mary’s neck breaking, and the elephant falling five feet back
to the ground. A larger chain was strung around her neck and Mary’s giant form was finally hoisted off the ground
where she hanged until she died. A crowd of anywhere from several hundred to several thousand witnessed the
execution. The event notably shares a linkage to the racially motivated lynchings of blacks in the South and, as
Powell points out, some accounts of the event also claim that Mary’s two black keepers were hanged alongside of
her. See pp. 10-18.
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It seems an absurdity that people pursuing fundamental principles of freedom and liberty
founded a nation based on discrimination (e.g., racism, sexism, classism, ethnocentrism,
anthropocentrism). Yet, the commonality of oppression has stood the test of time, dimming the
glow of the shining city upon a hill. Scholarship within the humanities and social sciences has
attempted to comprehend the intricacies of oppression, employing both pragmatic and theoretical
methods to address the idea as a problem in and of itself and as a response to other social,
historical, or philosophical elements that contribute to its existence; however, this is not to say
that academia’s frequent undertaking of the subject has been exhaustive. Unaddressed
complexities in the concepts regarding oppression emerge once examination of the subject is
situated in a different perspective. Academic disciplines primarily have centered their discourses
on the human as the prominent object of inquiry. In neglecting the oppression of nonhuman
animals as a source of comparison to understand fully human oppression, or the oppression of
any sentient being for that matter, the potential to create important linkages between the two is
limited, and essentially minimizes the scope for new knowledge. This is not to say that animals
are absent from academic discourses, rather that certain hesitancies exist in comparing the
similarities between human and nonhuman animals, especially when they are fused in similar
historical circumstances of oppression. This could be a reflection of anthropocentric attitudes
that undoubtedly formed and were reinforced in the organization of knowledge sets or also in a
tentativeness not only to revisit, but also to compare, animal suffering to certain episodes of
human suffering (e.g., American slavery and the Holocaust). The problem that arises when
making such comparisons is that episodes of human suffering often seem too sacred to expose,
thus maximizing the divide between human and animal. The scholars who pressed the limits
between human and animal suffering have contributed immensely to a conceptualization of the
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forces involved in human oppression and have extended the boundaries of ethics to those who
historically have been excluded from moral consideration. In conceiving the overall emphasis of
this work, scholars Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Carol Adams, Dominick LaCapra, Charles
Patterson, and Marjorie Spiegel, among others, have influenced profoundly my understanding of
oppression and the shared similarities existing in the historical marginalization of certain groups
of humans and animals.
In arguably the most prominent work ever written on issues related to animal welfare,
Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in 1975 set in motion a public debate that alerted and informed
the general public to the plight of the nonhuman animal. Singer's words, contained in the preface
to the first edition of the book, transcend historical eras, ethical systems, and the distinctions
between human and nonhuman animals. According to the author,
This book is about the tyranny of human over nonhuman animals. This tyranny has
caused and today is still causing an amount of pain and suffering that can only be
compared with that which resulted from the centuries of tyranny by white humans over
black humans. The struggle against this tyranny is a struggle as important as any of the
moral and social issues that have been fought over in recent years. 9
In situating the significance of animal welfare within a context similar to that of the abolition
movement, Singer not only pioneered a linkage deserving of further consideration, he also
eroded the limits of the human—animal divide. The research and methodology within this work
centers on a related idea of how humans investigate and interpret the circumstances of
oppression; what connections can be made and what can be learned when humans discard their
anthropocentric ideology and examine the forces of oppression outside of the limits of
anthropocentrism. Positioning the scope of my research on American culture from the
eighteenth century until the present allows me to make an inquiry into oppressive forces that can

9

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 1990), i.
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be compared across time and among the marginalized groups of human and nonhuman animals.
In merging historical incidences of oppression in America by highlighting the objectification and
repression of women, the enslavement of black humans, and the subjugation of animals through
factory farming, in particular, undeniable similarities surface substantiating the existence of a
culture of oppression. This claim is the focus of Chapter Two that details consistent forces
conditioning and perpetuating an environment of oppression that transcends historical contexts
of American culture and applies equally to the oppressed (human and nonhuman animals).
Chapter Three traces the industrialization of slaughter and the capitalist model of the factory
farm, where efficiency and profit drive the continuance of slavery, or an, “eternal Treblinka,” in
the words of Isaac Bashevis Singer, for the animal victims of unrestrained human dominion.
Chapter Four queries the moral status of nonhuman animals by explicating the ideologies of Tom
Regan and Peter Singer in determining whether a rights discourse or a utilitarian methodology is
best equipped to minimize the divide between human and animal. In referencing slave
narratives, contemporary news accounts, and secondary works are important. Among the latter,
critical are Spiegel’s The Dreaded Comparison and David Brion Davis’s Inhuman Bondage.
Chapter Five accentuates the parallels within the grasp of dominion through an exploration of
slavery as a transhistorical facet of American culture. Chapter Six examines Carol Adams’ work
The Sexual Politics of Meat in emphasizing the linkages between sexism and speciesism and how
both sustain a culture of oppression and contribute to the joint marginalization of animals and
women. The final chapter will revisit the human—animal divide by analyzing the approach of
posthumanism in acknowledging a resounding mutuality between the two, a likeness engrained
in the very essence of what it means to possess life and in the recognition of a shared
vulnerability to suffering.

12

CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A THEORY OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL OPPRESSION

These causes of oppression, rooted in history, remain a profound, indeed determinative,
part of the twenty-first century and continue to restrain the development of enlightened
thought and ethical social and economic practices.
-David Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation

In the summer of 2005, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a
multi-city exhibit and online gallery as part of a campaign labeled “Animal Liberation.” The
exhibit featured provocative images of American slaves and other groups of oppressed humans
alongside an array of similarly depicted animals, a shackled human foot beside that of a shackled
hoof, the branding of a slave alongside the branding of cow, and so on. Accompanying the
images was the following summary:
What is the common link between all atrocities in our society's past? The African slave
trade, the massacre and displacement of Native Americans, the oppression of women, and
forced child labor, were the products of a dangerous belief that those with power have the
right to abuse those without it. . . The only difference is that yesterday's victims—used
and abused because they were 'different' and powerless—are now of other species. 1
The comparison evident in the exhibit sparked outrage across the country. Shortly after the
campaigned launched, controversy ensued over what critics presumed to be a racist comparison.
The NAACP released a statement in opposition to the exhibit, when spokesman John White said,
“PETA operates by getting publicity any way they can. They're comparing chickens to black
people.” 2 Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center called the comparisons “disgusting,”

1

William Saletan, “KKK vs. KFC,” Slate, accessed April 9, 2014.
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2005/08/kkk_vs_kfc.html
2
Stephen Smith, “PETA Evaluates Charges of Racism,” CBS News, August 13, 2005.
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saying, “Black people in America have had quite enough of being compared to animals without
PETA joining in.” 3 Preceding the outrage over the exhibit, PETA previously had apologized
over a similar campaign featuring images of the Holocaust alongside those of factory farming.
In both instances, the predominant reaction of the news media, the blogosphere, and even
scholars, was to demonize the exhibits, calling those who would make such comparisons radical
or racist.
It has become abundantly clear in American culture that animal suffering and human
suffering are not equivalent and those willing to compare the two could be ostracized, censured,
and perhaps even “branded” racist. Should it be accepted, then, that oppression of animals and
humans is too dissimilar to compare? Or perhaps the sacralization in episodes of human
suffering, such as slavery or the Holocaust, is too profound to be likened to modern
circumstances of animal suffering. After all, are they not just animals? Such objection to
comparing human and animal suffering is inherently speciesist and not only solidifies an
anthropocentric ideology, but also limits human awareness in regard to our own responsibility in
prolonging a culture of oppression. Quite a lot can be learned about the homogeneity of
oppression across all groups and species by decentering a humanistic viewpoint in investigating
oppression. As I will contend in this chapter, through a comparative analysis of episodes of
oppression, both human and animal, certain consistencies emerge, enabling the development of a
general theory of oppression. The purpose of establishing a theory explaining the historical
uniformity of oppression is paramount in the context of this work on the animal victims of
human dominion. In showing the similarities, not only between the human and animal victims of
oppression, but also in the forces contributing to their victimization, the paradoxes of a recurring

3

Smith, “PETA Evaluates Charges of Racism.”
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culture of oppression can be challenged, the human—animal divide can be minimized, and
perhaps the light of moral consciousness can be extended to the shadows.
With a comparative analysis focusing on women, persons of color, and animals as
victims of oppression, my theoretical basis for this chapter centers on a four-phase progression of
oppression. The first phase, or the antecedent principle as I will call it, affirms the rise of
dominion through principles of capitalism; phase two is the marginalization of the other; phase
three is isolation of the marginalized; and phase four is exploitation of the isolated. In
developing a theory of oppression, it is imperative to establish the origins of dominion in the
West linking human and animal, but also to highlight oppression as procedural by detailing the
transition from the establishment of dominion towards the eventuality of episodic oppression. In
detailing the uniformity of oppression across boundaries, the occurrence of fundamental
elements that contribute to the formation of dominion that leads to a state of oppression
materializes. What I am suggesting is that the establishment of dominion must precede a state of
oppression. If slavery is understood as one instance of oppression, then dominion of one group
over another had to transpire prior to the actuality of enslavement. I refer to this as the
antecedent principle of oppression. 4
Within this theory of oppression, the antecedent principle signifies connectivity among
the oppressed groups assessed in this work, in that the oppression of each is only possible
through the simultaneous rise of a dominant group. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris
Marion Young defines oppression as an injustice and understands the existence of oppression as
a condition of all groups. 5 According to Young, “In its traditional usage, oppression means the

4

Dominion in the context of this work will be used interchangeably with the term dominant group. The act of
oppression itself, as I will contend, is perpetrated by those who dominate the “other.”
5
Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), Google
Play E-book, 52.
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exercise of tyranny by a ruling group.” 6 Yet, as Young points out, the meaning of oppression
began to shift during the liberal social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Young claims, “In its
new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because
a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-intentioned
liberal society.” 7 This seems to conflict with my contention that for oppression to occur
dominion must first be established. However, whether oppression is recognized in the tyrannical
sense or from a structural standpoint, both instances reflect dominion, whether this be by a
dominant group, by an individual exercising tyranny, or by a dominant discourse of ideas that
advocates oppressing some members within a society. The oppression of animals, women, and
blacks qualifies as structural oppression, because engrained ideologies of speciesism, sexism,
and racism created and upheld dominion over the three groups. The scholarship of Critical Race
Theory exemplifies understanding oppression in the structural sense. Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic explain,
The movement considers many of the same issues that conventional civil rights and
ethnic studies discourses take up, but places them in a broader perspective that includes
economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the
unconscious. Unlike traditional civil rights, which embraces incrementalism and step-bystep progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order,
including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral
principles of constitutional law. 8

Young reinforces this idea:
The systemic character of oppression implies than an oppressed group need not have a
correlate oppressing group. While structural oppression involves relations among groups,
these relations do not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of
6

Young, 52.
Ibid., 53.
8
Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 2nd edition (New York: New York University Press, 2012), Google Play EBook, 3.
7
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one group by another. Foucault (Discipline and Punish, 1977) suggests that to
understand the meaning and operation of power in modern society we must look beyond
the model of power as “sovereignty,” a dyadic relation of ruler and subject, and
reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living
their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression. 9

Herein lies the importance of the antecedent principle of oppression, especially in Western
society, where a culture of oppression is replicated by the original ideology for which dominion
forms, that is, by the establishment of a dominant race, species, religion, or gender.
The establishment of dominion in the West and its continuity in the oppression of
animals, women, and blacks derives primarily from an economic need grafted onto a deep-rooted
belief system. As Marxist theory contends, social relationships are embedded in economic forms
of production. In a capitalist society, these relationships are often based on exploitation, as the
ruling class extracts for its benefit the surplus value of another’s labor. 10 In the article “Can
Marxism Explain America’s Racism,” Sidney Willhelm writes,
Such treatment of labor is a form of economic exploitation because any value in excess of
production costs accrues to business owners rather than to the workers. Upon this
fundamental economic principle, a specific form of class system emerges with divergent
and incompatible economic imperatives: the upper (or ruling capitalist) class focuses
upon production to extract profits from labor; the working (or proletariat) class
necessarily copes with working conditions and the scale of pay in the form of wages. 11
Through the establishment of a ruling class (a dominant group) capitalism has developed and
sustained a structural system of oppression on the workers, whether this be from the origins of
slavery in America to modern methods of enslavement in the factory farm. Sociological theories
on minority groups traditionally have viewed dominant groups within a society as typical or

9

Young, 53-54.
Sidney Willhelm, “Can Marxism Explain America’s Racism,” Social Problems 28, no. 2 (December 1980): 98,
accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/800145
11
Ibid.
10
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“normal” members and minorities as distinct or foreign and have downplayed the significance of
structural oppressive agents. 12 Yet, as David Nibert contends in his book Animal Rights/Human
Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation, the term minority group should be
replaced with a term that is more forthright, “oppressed groups.” 13 According to Nibert, “The
term oppressed group [italics original] is not only more appropriate and honest but also avoids
the human-centered concept of minority groups and helps challenge the prevailing view that
human use and mistreatment of other animals lies in the realm of ‘natural affairs.’” 14 While a
capitalist mentality has been paramount in the continuance of a culture of oppression, deeply
embedded non-economic beliefs and practices also have been prominent in the establishment of
dominion and the designation of oppressed groups.
One such belief arising from eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking and deeply
rooted in the ideological positioning of the other, relegated women and persons of color as less
than “human” on the basis of their lacking reason or rationality in comparison to white men. It
is the idea of inferiority that scholars enforce such as eighteenth- century thinkers David Hume,
Voltaire, and Immanuel Kant. Hume wrote in a 1748 essay,
I am apt to suspect the Negroes, and in general all other species of men, to be naturally
inferior to the whites. There never was any civilized nation of any other complection
[sic] than white. . . . No ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences. . . .
Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages,
if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. 15

12

David Nibert, Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation (Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 5, accessed February 2, 2014. Kindle Electronic Edition.
13
Ibid., 6.
14
Ibid.
15
David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 629630.
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Voltaire, in common with Hume, wrote of the inferiority of black humans when he contended in
his 1756 essay:
Their eyes are not formed like ours. The black wool on their heads and other parts has no
resemblance to our hair; and it may be said that if their understanding is not of a different
nature from ours, it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great
application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor
abuses of our philosophy. They are a race peculiar to that part of Africa, the same as
elephants and monkeys.” 16
Likewise, Kant in 1764 substantiated the contentions of Hume and Voltaire: “The Negroes of
Africa have received from nature no intelligence that rises above the foolish. The difference
between the two races is thus a substantial one: it appears to be just as great in respect to the
faculties of the mind as in color. . . . Hume invites anyone to quote a single example of a Negro
who has exhibited talents.” 17
A similar perspective on the inferiority of women prevailed among the “great thinkers of
the Enlightenment,” notably Jean Jacques Rousseau and Kant. Rousseau claimed,
The needle and the sword cannot be wielded by the same hands. If I were sovereign, I
would permit sewing and the needle trades only to women and to cripples reduced to
occupations like theirs. . . . Why are they not satisfied by those made by nature, with
those crowds of cowardly men whose heart it has mutilated? The delicate and fearful man
is condemned by nature to a sedentary life. He is made to live with women or in their
manner. . . . How can men not be ashamed to encroach on those that women do? 18
Rousseau not only saw women’s position as inferior, he also inscribed in Èmile (On Education)
that although women possess “quick wit,” they lack creativity, the ability to reason abstractly, or
possess genius. Rousseau contended that women’s education should prepare them for

16

Voltaire, The Works of Voltaire, critique and biography by John Morley, notes by Tobias Smollett, trans. William
F. Fleming (New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901), 162.
17
Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1991), 55.
18
Jean Jacques Rousseau, On Education (1918), quoted in Paul Thomas, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sexist?” Feminist
Studies 17, no. 2 (Summer, 1991): 195, accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178331

19

domesticity as a wife or mother. 19 Although Kant’s dialogue on women’s rationality is
sometimes unclear, he posited that women, like men, possessed rationality but often were
inhibited from exercising it. 20 Kant contended, “Woman’s nature is identified with inclination,
and it would appear that in the kingdom of rational beings there are only adult males.” 21 Such
presumptions held by leading thinkers of the dominant group ultimately instituted and reinforced
the patriarchal and paternal nature of Western thought.
The Enlightenment also perpetuated the anthropocentric ideology still prevalent within
Western society today. Many scholars contend that racism was born out of the Enlightenment,
but that the depreciated status of animals conveyed through Cartesian dialogue set the tone for
the Enlightenment. 22 Although Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Rousseau upgraded
the status of animals from the insentient mechanical creatures that Descartes concluded they
were to a higher form of life, most Enlightenment thinkers still divided the human from animal,
similar to the chasm between white and black and man and woman.
The viewpoints that contributed to the shaping of governments and the founding of
academic disciplines and social institutions contributed to the formation of an adverse category
19
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of “other”, a social construct specified by a position of obscurity and vulnerability. Taking
advantage of this vulnerability constitutes, essentially, the origin of oppression. In Justice and
the Politics of Difference, Young divides oppression into five categories, which she terms the
five distinct faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence. 23 The theory of oppression that I propose differs from Young’s
suggestions on several notable points. First, Young examines oppression only as it relates to
humans. She does not explicitly exclude non-human animals, but makes no mention of them as
victims of individual acts of tyranny or victims within structural oppression. Second, although
Young recognizes different and distinct patterns or occurrences of oppression, she nonetheless
finds the cohesiveness in these patterns to be embedded in an overlying system of institutional or
structural oppression. Alternatively, I find the cohesiveness of the occurrences of oppression to
be procedural, rather than structural. This is not to say that structural oppression is absent but
rather that it differs in kind due to a pattern of progression, or in regard to how oppression
proceeds from one stage to another.
The theoretical framework of oppression traces the rise of a dominant group in Western
society by way of the establishment of dominion (the antecedent principle of oppression). Once
dominion is established within a society, what follows in a pattern of oppression are
marginalization, isolation, and exploitation. Marginalization, essentially, is the removal of a
group to the margins of society that thus creates a category of other. According to Young,
marginalization occurs when, “A whole category of people is expelled from useful participation
in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even
extermination.” 24 Marginalization effectively lessens the status of a group of humans or even a
23
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group of animals by excluding them from equal benefits to others within a society. 25 In
advanced capitalist societies, Young contends that marginality represents two categories of
injustice: “First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustice by depriving those
dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have. Second. . . . marginalization is unjust
because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized
ways.” 26 This is a fundamentally humanistic explanation of marginalization, but it can be
applied to non-human animals as well. Relegating non-human animals to a lesser status denies
them the ability to exercise their innate capacities, those naturally found characteristics within
both human and nonhuman animals, such as a desire for freedom or a preference for pleasure
instead of pain. Thus, marginalization arises from the establishment of dominion. Once a
dominant group emerges, those outside of the group become marginal. Racism derives from the
Enlightenment idea of the superiority of one group (whites) over others (those of color). The
superior group dominates the inferior because the latter “lacks” preferred traits found in the
former. In this sense, oppression is very much a process, as the rise of the dominant group
creates a societal hierarchy that places the dominant group atop.
Although marginalization is indeed a facet of oppression, I suggest that it is an initial
phase of oppression. As the white human male assumed dominion through the dissemination
and acceptance in the West of Enlightenment ideas of his possession of traits (e.g. reason, control
of emotions). Women, persons of color, and animals thus were positioned outside of the social
contract, effectively becoming marginal to the white human male and forming the other. Once
marginalized, they then could be isolated. Through a set of essential oppressive structures
consistent in western culture, isolation proceeds. Isolation of the marginal can take two forms,
25
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physical isolation, as in bodily placement outside or away from concentrated groups of people,
and cognitive isolation, which separates the marginalized from the consciousness of society.
Marginalizing a group distinguishes the group as different and inferior, while isolation builds
barriers to keep the groups in a place of submissiveness. In Young’s discussion of structural
oppression, isolation can be seen as a contributing factor not only in the continuance and
establishment of structural oppression in Western society over time, but also in procedural
oppression that eventually leads to exploitation. Isolation confirms the powerlessness of
marginalized groups and is the central barrier that preserves classes of other as marginal.
According to Young, “The powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this
mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; the powerless
are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them.” 27 Of note in
Young’s description of powerlessness is her use of the word “situated” that she applies to the
idea of a concrete position within society. Young’s explanation of powerlessness, as I suggest,
in part is based on the establishment of dominion and the creation of the other and emphasized
through isolation.
A central feature of isolating a subservient human group is to dehumanize it. In
“Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Nick Haslam defines dehumanization, in part, as a
process of moral exclusion that denies individuals identity and community. 28 Denying identity
removes the perception of a person as an independent, distinguishable individual with a capacity
to make choices. 29 Denying the human and nonhuman animal of community excludes each from
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the moral community or of an “interconnected network of individuals who care for each other.” 30
According to Haslam, “When people are divested of these agentic and communal aspects of
humanness they are deindividuated, lose the capacity to evoke compassion and moral emotions,
and may be treated as means toward vicious ends.” 31 Dehumanization is an inherently
anthropocentric term because in dehumanizing, it is assumed that status is relegated to one less
than human or to that of an animal. Dehumanizing essentially means to relegate one to a status
of animal. According to Haslam, “A consistent theme in this work is the likening of people to
animals. In racist descriptions Africans are compared to apes and sometimes explicitly denied
membership of the human species.” 32 As Yehuda Bauer claims, the comparisons to animals
through Nazi propaganda in the Holocaust portrayed Jews as: “vermin, rats, or other noxious
elements from the insect or animal world.” 33 Women also are dehumanized, but by men, often
in regard to their sexuality. According to Haslam,
Dehumanization is commonly discussed in feminist writings on the representation of
women in pornography. Pornography is said to dehumanize women by representing
them in an objectified fashion, by implication removing women from full moral
consideration and legitimating rape and victimization. . . . According to Ortner (1974),
women are pan-culturally ‘seen as representing a lower order of being, as being less
transcendental of nature than men,’ and femaleness is equated with animality, nature, and
childlikeness. 34

The dehumanization of persons of color and women all share a linkage to the objectification of
animals. All are denied status of subject, perhaps by the dominant group (males) focusing on a
portion of their bodies or only on their sexuality and, instead, they become objects that then can
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be exploited for society’s gain. Isolation by means of objectification or dehumanization is
essentially the barrier that keeps certain groups within a culture of oppression in a place of
submissiveness. This assures that the status quo will not be challenged.
Through marginalization and isolation, exploitation as a process of oppression can then
proceed. In Western cultures, exploitation often uses capitalism to oppress. According to
Young, in respect to Marx’s theory of exploitation,
The injustice of capitalist society consists in the fact that some people exercise their
capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other
people. Through private ownership of the means of production, and through markets that
allocate labor and the ability to buy goods, capitalism systematically transfers the powers
of some persons to others, thereby augmenting the power of the latter. 35

The contention here is that in the capitalist system, the capitalist holds the power to extract
benefits from the workers, thereby exploiting them. 36 Similarly, it must be acknowledged that
slavery, unequal pay for women, and factory farming are consistent within a capitalist system
and all constitute instances of exploitation.
It is also notable that exploitation is an all-encompassing form of oppression that Robert
Goodin defines by s-exploitation (situational) and p-exploitation (person). 37 According to Robert
Mayer’s explanation of Goodin’s theory, “All cases of exploitation are instances of situationexploitation in which agents turn some favorable circumstance in their situation or environment
to their advantage.” 38 Person-exploitation involves a person or group gaining at the expense of
another and the wrongness of p-exploitation is founded on the emphasis of human obligation to
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others based in part on the vulnerabilities of the exploited person (or in our case a human person
or an animal). 39 Mayer writes,
P-exploitation only occurs in exchange relationships or bilateral transactions. . . . The
characteristic indicator of an exploitative transaction is disproportionality in the
distribution of benefits and burdens: the exploited assume disproportionate burdens for
the benefit received, while exploiters gain much at little cost. . . . Those who exploit
others take advantage of an initial inequality, which they ought not to do. As a result, the
exploited get less than they should from the exchange. Fairness is only achieved when the
contending parties are made equal, by eliminating the illegitimate advantages. 40
A key element of Goodin’s theory of exploitation is that people have a moral obligation to
protect the vulnerable, but their exploitation of the other acts in opposition to this because, by
definition, exploitative acts use the vulnerabilities of others to gain benefits for some. 41 In my
theory of oppression, it is the marginalization and isolation of certain humans and animals that
establishes these vulnerabilities. Exploitation occurs when people choose to act on these
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities of animals, women, and persons of color link first and
foremost to their places outside of the dominant group. The attribution of a lesser status
reinforces the marginal group’s place outside of the dominant group and the marginal group’s
lowered status reinforces their isolation and inferiority. When the dominant exploit the
vulnerabilities of the marginal, oppression by means of exploitation is the result.
The dominant group’s marginalization and isolation of a group escalates the other’s
vulnerability, minimizing their power and autonomy. Exploitation stands as the exhibition of
power and control of one group over the marginalized and isolated human and animal body.
Slavery, factory farming, and pornography all stand as manifestations of control over the
oppressed body. The white human male’s seizure of power over those outside of the dominant
39
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group established dominion and led to the marginalization of women, blacks, and animals.
Dehumanization and objectification intensify the divide between the dominant and marginal
groups and solidifies their isolation as other. Once made vulnerable by the dominant group,
persons of color were exploited for their labor through enslavement; women were/are exploited
through their subservience in marriage and low wages in the work place; and animals were/are
exploited as commodities in factory farming, vivisection, and hunting. The marginalization and
isolation of these groups also appropriate them not only for exploitation, but also for violence, a
constant element of their exploitation and vulnerability. If the wrongfulness of exploitation is
indeed due to the violation of a moral obligation to protect the vulnerable, what is it that the
vulnerable all share that warrants such an obligation? Suffering. This suffering will be explored
in greater depth through an examination of the industrialization of oppression in the
slaughterhouse and factory farm.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF MURDER AND THE FACTORY FARM

In relation to them, all people are Nazis: for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka.
- Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Letter Writer

Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle depicts the struggles of a fictional family of
Lithuanian workers in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. Although Sinclair’s intention
was to portray the plight of immigrant workers within the American capitalist economy through
the point of view of the novel’s protagonist Jurgis Rudkus, The Jungle offered readers an initial
glimpse into the horrors of the slaughterhouse. In one particular scene, Sinclair detailed the
automation, efficiency, and cruelty exhibited in the slaughterhouse at the turn of the twentiethcentury:
They had chains which they fastened about the leg of the nearest hog, and the other end
of the chain they hooked into one of the rings upon the wheel. So, as the wheel turned, a
hog was suddenly jerked off his feet and borne aloft. At the same instant the ear was
assailed by a most terrifying shriek. . . . The shriek was followed by another, louder and
yet more agonizing--for once started upon that journey, the hog never came back; at the
top of the wheel he was shunted off upon a trolley and went sailing down the room. And
meantime another was swung up, and then another, and another, until there was a double
line of them, each dangling by a foot and kicking in frenzy--and squealing. The uproar
was appalling, perilous to the ear-drums; one feared there was too much sound for the
room to hold--that the walls must give way or the ceiling crack. There were high squeals
and low squeals, grunts, and wails of agony; there would come a momentary lull, and
then a fresh outburst, louder than ever, surging up to a deafening climax. . . . Meantime,
heedless of all these things, the men upon the floor were going about their work. Neither
squeals of hogs nor tears of visitors made any difference to them; one by one they hooked
up the hogs, and one by one with a swift stroke they slit their throats. There was a long
line of hogs, with squeals and life-blood ebbing away together; until at last each started
again, and vanished with a splash into a huge vat of boiling water. It was all so very
businesslike that one watched it fascinated. It was pork-making by machinery, pork28

making by applied mathematics. And yet somehow the most matter-of-fact person could
not help thinking of the hogs; they were so innocent, they came so very trustingly; and
they were so very human in their protests--and so perfectly within their rights! They had
done nothing to deserve it; and it was adding insult to injury, as the thing was done here,
swinging them up in this cold-blooded, impersonal way, without a pretence at apology,
without the homage of a tear. Now and then a visitor wept, to be sure; but this
slaughtering-machine ran on, visitors or no visitors. It was like some horrible crime
committed in a dungeon, all unseen and unheeded, buried out of sight and of memory. 1

The Jungle originally appeared as a series of installments in the socialist newspaper The
Appeal to Reason and quickly gained notoriety as a large number of readers requested the
installments in book form. 2 Fearing repercussions from the powerful meat industry, most
publishers shied away from publishing the book. However, New York’s Doubleday, Page, and
Company decided the potential earnings of the book were worth the risk. According to Charles
Patterson in Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, “To protect itself
against possible lawsuits, Doubleday sent one of its own editors, Isaac Marcosson, to Chicago to
check out the accuracy of Sinclair’s descriptions.” 3 Marcosson confirmed Sinclair’s account,
later stating, “I was able to get a Meat Inspector’s badge, which gave me access to the secret
confines of the meat empire. . . . Day and night I prowled over its foul-smelling domain and I
was able to see with my own eyes much that Sinclair had never even heard about.” 4
Perhaps no other western practice has contributed so profoundly to animal suffering and
death than the factory farm and slaughterhouse. As outlined by Sinclair in his critique of
capitalism, the slaughterhouse stands as a capitalist model for the efficiency and automation of
slaughter. The efficiency and automation of murder is central to Charles Patterson’s Eternal
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Treblinka, wherein he examines the parallels between the atrocities committed against the human
victims of the Holocaust and the animal victim of human dominion. Patterson divides his
discussion of the comparisons between the Holocaust and modern society’s oppression of
animals into two major parts. The first half details the establishment of the human as the master
species and connects this idea to the Nazi concept of a master race. The second half traces the
industrialization of slaughter, both in the system implemented in the Holocaust through the Nazi
death camps, as well as in the modern factory farm and slaughterhouse. According to Patterson,
“The philosopher Theodor Adorno (1903-69), a German Jew who was forced into exile by the
Nazis. . . .wrote, ‘Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks:
they’re only animals.’ If Professor Adorno is right. . .the road to Auschwitz begins at the
slaughterhouse.” 5
The history of the slaughterhouse and the twentieth-century development of the factory
farm have been interwoven in the progression of American capitalism. Commercial meatpacking
began in North America around 1660, with the opening of a warehouse in Springfield,
Massachusetts. 6 These early American meatpacking facilities, Patterson contends, “clubbed,
stabbed, and hung the pigs upside down to drain.” 7 By mid-nineteenth century, pig flesh was the
most common “meat” in America and Cincinnati was home to the country’s booming pork
industry; in 1844 the city had 26 slaughterhouses, just three years later the number had grown to
40. 8 The methods utilized to end the pigs’ life consisted of beating them into submission with
clubs before slitting their throat. 9 Patterson contends, “The rough way Americans treated farm
animals made an impression on new European immigrants. One Dutchman wrote back to his
5
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friends in the Netherlands that American farmers had no regard for their animals.” 10 By 1850,
the organization of labor became a staple of the meat packaging industry as larger plants began
coupling their slaughter and packing operations. 11 From 1850 until the 1860s, another shift
occurred as Chicago replaced Cincinnati as the new “slaughter capital of America,” a result of its
many railroad lines, as well as the opening of the Union Stock Yards. The Union Stock Yards
consisted of 2,300 interlocked livestock pens, making it the largest of its kind in the world. 12 As
Patterson details, “By 1886. . .with trains every day unloading hundreds of cars full of western
longhorn cattle, sheep, and pigs into the Yards’ vast network of pens. In order to handle the
growing volume of livestock transported on rail lines. . . .meatpackers introduced the conveyor
belt to increase the speed and efficiency of the nation’s first mass-production industry.” 13 Less
than a decade before publication of Sinclair’s controversial work on the slaughterhouse, Union
Stock Yards during its existence had slaughtered nearly 400 million animals. 14
Patterson contends that the differences in the practice of the slaughter of animals
“between the early 1900s and today mostly have to do with much faster line speeds and a
tremendous increase in volume.” 15 In fact, as Patterson writes, “Today, what one activist
describes as the ‘cruel, fast, tightly run, profit-driven system of torture and murder in which
animals are hardly thought of as living beings. . . .kills more animals in a single day than all the
slaughterhouses in Sinclair’s day killed in a year.” 16 The fundamental operations of “assemblyline” slaughter today actually are not all that different from the process used 100 years ago.
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The continuity of assembly-line slaughter, now stretching over more than a century, can
be explained through the popularity and resilience of Fordism. Patterson writes, “In his
autobiography, My Life and Work (1922), Ford revealed that his inspiration for assembly-line
production came from a visit he made as a young man to a Chicago slaughterhouse.” 17 Henry
Ford’s glimpse into the efficiency of slaughter and dismemberment sparked a monumental
change in the American economic system of production. Fordism applied the techniques of the
early-twentieth century slaughterhouse to implement a system of mechanized mass production
that relied on the foundational principles of standardization and mechanization. According to
Heery and Noon,
His [Ford] production system was characterized by several important features: linear
work sequencing, an interdependence of tasks, a moving assembly line, the use and
refinement of dedicated machinery, and specialized machine tools. . . . Fordism is geared
towards mass production, which depends upon mass consumption. Changes in patterns of
consumption would therefore require changes in the work organization or else render
Fordist production inappropriate. 18
The Fordist production system sought maximum throughput in factories and depended on the
logistics of each factory. According to Jonathan Rees, “While sometimes defined as the
productivity of a factory, throughput is actually a measure of the speed and volume of the flow of
goods through the production process. . . . Starting in the 1880s, inventors developed new
machinery like conveyors and rollers, which made production through a continuous process
possible.” 19 The use of the assembly line in the Ford Motor Company’s factories revolutionized
the American production system; moreover, its ability to maximize efficiency guaranteed the
implementation of Fordism anywhere efficiency was sought.
17

Ibid., 70.
Edmund Heery and Mike Noon, “Fordism,” In A Dictionary of Human Resource Management. 2nd revised
edition. Oxford University Press, 2008. Accessed June 10, 2014. http://www.oxfordreference.com.
19
Jonathan Rees, Industrialization and the Transformation of American Life (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2013),
113.
18

32

Although Fordism helped stretch the industrialization of production, it borrowed greatly
from production methods established by Frederick Winslow Taylor. In his 1911 book The
Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor theorized the importance of conserving the strength
of the worker by minimizing his/her bodily movement, and thus increasing work efficiency. 20
Rees writes, “Ending that waste of motion, Taylor thought, would obviously benefit
management, but also it would create what he called ‘first-class men,’ efficient employees who
would then be able to keep more of the benefit of that efficiency for themselves, thereby
mitigating the negative effects of industrialization on those workers.” 21 Taylor studied the
operations of workers and then broke up their tasks into parts, timing them with a stopwatch in
order to measure their efficiency. This allowed him to select the most efficient and organized
method of labor. 22 Another emphasis Taylor recommended was to implement “piece rates,”
where employees would be paid based on output rather than a consistent wage for the job. 23
Taylor contended that piece work would motivate workers to maximize their output, thus
increasing their efficiency. According to Rees, “To determine where the piece rate should be set,
he made an arbitrary decision as to how fast a normal worker should be going and then set the
piece rate to reflect that.” 24 Rees contends, “The advantage of this system was that if the
employees met this standard, employers could lower the piece rate and get workers working even
harder to reach the same rate.” 25 This method, known as the speedup, not only pitted workers
against one another, by putting greater emphasis on one individual’s production, but it also took
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knowledge away from the employees productive capabilities and gave it to the employers. 26
These principles of efficiency helped to define scientific management and Taylor’s impact on it
was so profound that the process was—and is—often referred to as Taylorism. 27
Slaughterhouse owners implemented the principles of Fordism and Taylorism to
maximize the efficiency of slaughterhouses and to increase their output, and heighten and
intensify the industrialization of slaughter. These principles, later adopted by the Nazis, not only
were implemented to conquer most of Europe with the construction of an efficient military, but
helped lead to the slaughter of millions of Jews in Nazi death camps. As Patterson notes, “Hitler
regarded Ford as a comrade-in-arms and kept a life-sized portrait of him on the wall next to his
desk in his office at the Nazi party headquarters in Munich.” 28 Ford was also the only American
to be mentioned in Mein Kampf, where Hitler praised his endeavors. 29
The same techniques used to exterminate millions of humans in the 1930s and 1940s
continue to be employed today through similar but perfected and even more efficient techniques
in the slaughterhouse. Political artist, animal activist, and author Sue Coe traveled the United
States for six years visiting slaughterhouses, where she sketched and described what she had
witnessed. She later documented these encounters in her book Dead Meat. 30 Patterson details
several of Coe’s encounters, but none epitomizes the cruelty and suffering within American
slaughterhouses more than her recollection of a small family-owned slaughterhouse in
Pennsylvania:
She enters the facility shortly before the lunch break: ‘We step into a large room, and I
look up and see corpses of huge, skinned animals. . . .’I definitely do not want to fall in
all the blood and intestines,’ writes Coe. ‘The workers are wearing nonslip boots, yellow
26
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aprons, and hard hats. It is a scene of controlled, mechanized, chaos. Like most
slaughterhouses, ‘this place is dirty—filthy in fact—flies swarm everywhere. The walls,
floors, everything, everywhere are covered with blood. The chains are caked with dried
blood.’. . . As she walks onto the kill floor to position herself with her sketchbook in the
doorway between where the cows are lined up for slaughter and the kill floor, a loud horn
suddenly sounds and the workers disperse for lunch. Coe sees something move to her
right, so she edges closer to the knocking pen to get a better look. ‘Inside is a cow. She
has not been stunned and has slipped and fallen in the blood. The men have gone to
lunch and left her. Time passes. Occasionally she struggles, banging the sides of the
steel enclosure with her hooves. . . .Once she raises her head enough to look outside the
box, but seeing the hanging corpses she falls back again.’ Coe starts drawing, but when
she looks back at the box, she notices that the weight of the cow’s body has forced milk
from her udders. As the milk flows in a small stream toward the drainage area, it mixes
with blood so they go down the drain together. One of the injured cow’s legs is sticking
out of the bottom of the steel enclosure. . . .When the workers return from their lunch
break, they tie on their yellow aprons and get back to work. Coe sees a man she hadn’t
noticed before come in. He kicks the injured cow hard three or four times to try to get
her to stand up, but she can’t. Danny leans over into the box to try to shoot her with his
compression stunner, which will drive a five-inch bolt into her brain. When he thinks he
has good aim at her head, he fires. . . .He goes over to her, chains one of her legs, and
swings her up. She struggles, and her legs kick as she swings upside down. Danny talks
to the unstunned ones as he slits their throats, ‘Come on girl, take it easy.’ 31
Coe later wrote of her tour of the slaughterhouses, “This is Dante’s Inferno,’. . . .‘steam,
noise, blood, smell, and speed. Sprinklers wash off meat, giant vacuum-packing machines use
heat to seal twenty-two pieces of flesh a minute.” 32 According to Patterson,
Coe’s reference here to ‘Dante’s Inferno’ brings to mind the reaction of Franz Stangl to
the Treblinka death camp when he arrived to take up his duties as commandant. . .
.’Treblinka that day was the most awful thing I saw during all of the Third Reich’—he
buried his face in his hands—‘it was ‘Dante’s Inferno,’ he said through his fingers. ‘It
was Dante come to life. When I entered the camp and got out of the car on the square I
stepped knee-deep into notes, currency, precious stones, jewelry, clothes. They were
everywhere, strewn all over the square. The smell was indescribable; the hundreds, no,
the thousands of bodies everywhere, decomposing, putrefying. 33
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The industrialization of slaughter that treats human and non-human animals alike as
nothing more than commodities in a system designed for speed and efficiency, links the
slaughterhouse and the extermination of billions of non-human animals and the extermination of
millions of humans in the Holocaust. Patterson claims that the industrialized slaughter of cattle,
pigs, sheep, and other animals “paved the way, at least indirectly, for the final solution.” 34 He
writes, “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our
victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each
other.” 35 Many Nazi practices were modeled on the practices in the slaughterhouse. According
to Patterson, “It is significant that the Nazis treated their victims like animals before they
murdered them. . . .The Nazis forced those whom they were about to murder to get completely
undressed and huddle together, something that is not normal behavior for human beings.
Nakedness suggests an identity as animals; when combined with crowding, it suggests a herd of
cattle or sheep.” 36 Dehumanizing victims made them easy to kill. Two of the most highly
industrialized nations of the twentieth century, Germany and the United States, accounted for the
slaughter of millions of human and nonhuman animals through the American slaughterhouse and
the German gas chambers. 37
Although the purpose of killing, as well as the identity of the victims differed, both the
slaughterhouse and gas chamber share certain qualities. As Patterson contends, the shared
operations or methodology of industrialized killing in the slaughterhouse and in Nazi death
camps consists of: (1) streamlining the process, (2) the chute/funnel/tube, (3) processing the sick,
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weak, or injured, and (4) the concept of “humane slaughter.” 38 Streamlining the process refers to
the essential elements of speed and efficiency at both American slaughterhouses and Nazi death
camps. Patterson elaborates, “At killing centers speed and efficiency are essential for the success
of the operation. Just the right mix of deception, intimidation, physical force, and speed is
needed to minimize the chance of panic or resistance that will disrupt the process.” 39 Speed is
also critical to increase the numbers killed within short periods of time and efficiency suppresses
the “operator’s” potential for feeling guilt after the fact, or their concern for the victims during
the act. 40 Key elements of streamlining the process, as Patterson claims, make the “acts of mass
murder as routine, mechanical, repetitive, and programmed as possible.” 41
In both killing centers, the chute, funnel, or tube stands as the last passage for the human
or animal before death. One example of this mechanism, described by Patterson, can be found at
a facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, where “the nearly block-long underground passage used
to drive livestock from the stockyard to the Morrell meatpacking plant is called the ‘Tunnel of
Death.’” 42 Most slaughterhouses use similar passages to reduce panic, maintain order, and keep
the process speedy and efficient. Crucial to Patterson’s analysis, at the Nazi death camps Belzec,
Sobibor, and Treblinka, “the tube was the final passage that led to the gas chambers, once inside
the tube, death was imminent. 43
The sick, weak, or injured “interfere” with the speed and efficiency of the process. 44 As
Patterson details,
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Each center has to find ways to deal with those who can’t keep up. At Treblinka, after a
camp staff member ordered the new arrivals to turn over their luggage and valuables and
prepare themselves for the shower. . . .the staff member told the old, the sick, the injured,
and mothers with babies to go to the ‘infirmary,’ where they would receive medical
attention. So while guards drove those designated for gassing to the disrobing area, other
guards led those destined for the ‘infirmary’ up the path to the execution pit. 45

Animals too sick, old, or injured to move quickly through the process are either left behind until
workers have time to deal with them or they are cast into the “dead pile.” 46 One “bitterly ironic”
feature of killing operations, Patterson writes, “is their [operations] sic attempt to make killing
more humane.” 47 Hitler conveyed the need for humane killing policies and believed it to be more
humane to kill “defective” children than to let them live. 48 In the United States, the 1958
Humane Slaughter Act, sought to make the slaughter of livestock more humane, stating,
“animals whose meat is sold to the federal government or its agencies be rendered ‘insensible to
pain’. . . .before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut.” 49
The shared qualities of the industrialization of slaughter is emphasized in the title of
Patterson’s work, taken from the Yiddish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer, who escaped the
Holocaust in his native Poland to come to the United States. Treblinka, a Nazi extermination
camp located in Poland, claimed more lives during the Holocaust than any other death camp,
except Auschwitz. 50 The title derives from Singer’s “The Letter Writer,” wherein he links the
oppression of animals to the Nazi crimes at the Treblinka extermination camp:
In his thoughts, Herman spoke a eulogy for the mouse who had shared a portion of her
life with him and who, because of him, had left this earth. “What do they know—all
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these scholars, all these philosophers, all the leaders of the world—about such as you?”
They have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all the species, is the
crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to provide him with food,
pelts, to be tormented exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis: for the
animals it is an eternal Treblinka. 51

The eternal Treblinka for animals continues today as the interwoven practices of factory
farming and slaughter have increased as the demand for animal flesh rises. Such high demand,
coupled with the desire to increase production, led to a notable shift in the American agricultural
system in the last half of the twentieth century. This shift was contingent on the disappearance
of small and medium-size dairy, cattle, and hog farms, as they were replaced by large scale,
highly intensive factory farms. 52 Similar to the industrial shift seen in the slaughterhouse at the
turn of the twentieth century, farms became transformed into factories beginning in the 1920s
and lasting through the 1970s. As Jim Mason discusses in the introduction to Animal Factories,
The reality of a modern animal factory stands in sharp contrast to the farm of our
fantasies. . . . Farms like the one of my childhood are rapidly being replaced by animal
factories. Animals are reared in huge buildings, crowded in with cages stacked up like so
many shipping crates. On the factory farms there are no pastures, no streams, no seasons,
not even day and night. Animal-wise herdsmen and milkmaids have been replaced by
automated feeders, computers, closed-circuit television, and vacuum pumps. Health and
productivity come not from frolics in sunny meadows but from syringes and additivelaced feed. 53
As Deborah Fitzgerald contended in her book Every Farm a Factory, the financial crisis of the
1980s threw the farming industry into crisis and finalized the transition from farm to factory. 54
Experts offered various explanations for this new farming crisis, but at the time of the financial
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crisis no one was certain. What could be agreed upon was the similarity the current crisis shared
with the farming crash of the 1920s. As Fitzgerald notes, “The approaches at the time missed a
fundamental feature of twentieth-century agriculture, and that is the emergence of an industrial
logic or ideal in agriculture.” 55 She explains,
Beginning in the 1920s, farmers and their families had to contend with a new set of
opportunities and constraints, most of which grew out of the new industrial production
systems. These systems, epitomized by the modern mass production factory and
industrial boardroom, linked capital, raw materials, transportation networks,
communication systems, and newly trained technical experts. Interconnected and often
sprawling, these systems of production and consumption functioned like grids into which
ﬁt the more identiﬁable components of industrialization—the tractors, paved roads, bank
credit, migrant labor, and commodity markets. 56
It was this system, Fitzgerald argues, one reflective of industrialization, first in the 1920s and
again in the 1980s, that linked farms and farmers in prosperity and crisis. It aligned them with
new agents, technologies, and practices. 57 Thus, the transformation of the farm to factory,
cannot be linked to one specific time but happened as part of a gradual process of modernization.
Following World War II, leaders in business and agriculture suggested that the struggling
agricultural industry was in need of modernization in order to become more profitable and
efficient, like the factories that earlier had adopted the principles of Taylor and Ford. 58
Fitzgerald writes, “Timeliness of operations, large-scale production sites, mechanization,
standardization of product, specialization, speed of throughput, routinization of the workforce,
and a belief that success was based ﬁrst and foremost upon a notion of “efﬁciency”—all these
principles were drawn directly from the factories and businesses only recently declared
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successful.” 59 For famers this meant following a model that by now had been proven successful.
Fitzgerald explains, “Henry Ford’s production facilities, for instance, stood as a dramatic
example of the efﬁcacy of rational management techniques, which many felt should now be
applied to farming. As an International Harvester promotion exhorted [by 1920], ‘Every Farm a
Factory.’” 60
Although the industrialization of slaughterhouses progressed rapidly, the industrialization
of the farm constituted more of a gradual process though three prominent eras of industrialization
that transformed the local farm from small plots of crops and pastures, to the highly intensive,
mechanized, and efficient methods seen today in factory farms. Fitzgerald points to the years
following World War I, the decade following World War II, and the 1970s, as the three major
eras of industrialization that witnessed the farm undergo its greatest transformations. 61 Leading
up to World War I, the success of the modern factory system was evident and Ford’s Highland
Park and River Rouge factories stood as the example. As Fitzgerald notes,
Here the various components of modern factory production, of industrialization, came
together in dramatic display. This system encompassed not only the physical handling of
materials, the moving assembly line, and the mechanization of small tasks, but also the
unprecedented managerial interest in workers’ personal lives and the aggressive attempt
to mold each worker into a perfect, Americanized cog in the Fordist machine. 62

As industrialization transformed the operations inside the factory through the applied
principles of Taylorism and Fordism, American culture felt the change. Fitzgerald explains,
“Taylor and Ford were only the most obvious examples of the sea change occurring in America
in the years leading up to World War I. In businesses, schools, homes, government ofﬁces,
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factories, cities, and towns, even in the arts, the unmistakable trajectory was from the chaotic to
the controlled, from loose to tight, from spontaneous to planned, from curved to straight.” 63
Although the American agricultural system at first proved resilient to major change, as World
War I came to an end very few farms remained untouched by industrialization. 64 According to
Fitzgerald, “As the war began to recede from view, it became apparent that the agricultural
system was in serious disrepair. No longer could one speak of a few desultory farmers who
lacked ability; now even good farmers were caught in the industrial web.” 65 Over the next 50
years the transformation of farm to factory would become complete and it would be the animals
who would pay the greatest price for human “advancement.”
In the 1970s, another era of industrialization took hold in the American agricultural
system as modernization and new technological advances allowed for the animal body to be
manipulated and standardized, much like the machinery driving Ford’s assembly lines. As
Mason and Singer note, “Constant manipulations of animals’ anatomy, physiology, heredity, and
environment are required to keep health problems and other costs down so that commodity
production can proceed at a profitable level. 66 The status of these factory animals as
commodities was apparent in the trade journals of the time. The March 1978 edition of National
Hog Farmer instructed, “The breeding sow should be thought of, and treated as, a valuable piece
of machinery whose function is to pump out baby pigs like a sausage machine.” 67 One entry in
the March 1976 issue of Farm Journal in a reference to pigs’ states, “They can still eat—total
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darkness has no effect on their appetites.” 68 In January 1976, the Farm Journal suggested,
“Estrus control will open the doors to factory hog production. Control of female cycles is the
missing link to the assembly-line approach.” 69 Yet another entry in Hog Farm Management in
1976 read: “Forget the pig is an animal. Treat him just like a machine in a factory. Schedule
treatments like you would lubrication. Breeding season like the first step in an assembly line.
And marketing like the delivery of finished goods.” 70
Despite the ongoing shift in the American agricultural system, it was not until 1997 that
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) first recognized factory farms. In 1997,
through data provided in the Census of Agriculture, the USDA defined factory farms as
operations consisting of at least 500 beef cattle, 500 dairy cows, and 1,000 hogs on a single
feedlot. For chickens, the criterion was 100,000 egg-laying chickens and 500,000 broiler
chickens housed in a single location. 71 During the first decade of the twenty-first century,
another trend became evident: livestock numbers within individual factory farms were increasing
at alarming rates. An analysis conducted by the Food & Water Watch from 2002 to 2007, found
livestock numbers on the largest American factory farms increased by 20 percent; from 1997 to
2007, cows on factory dairy farms doubled in population. In fact, every species of livestock in
intensive farming practices increased over the 10-year period. 72 The report by the Food & Water
Watch attributes the substantial growth from 1997 to 2007 of the factory farm to three factors:
(1) Misguided farm policy encouraged over-production of commodity crops such as corn and
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soybeans that artificially depressed the price of livestock feed and created an indirect subsidy to
factory farm operations; (2) a lack of interference in the mergers and acquisitions of the largest
agribusinesses encouraged other factory farms to grow in order to stay competitive; (3) and loose
environmental rules failed to hold factory farms responsible for the pollution that was a product
of intensive agricultural practices. 73
The substantial growth of the factory farm, both in the number of farms and in livestock
population, had a profound impact on the environment and individual animal species. A 2009
USDA report found that almost nine billion animals were slaughtered in the United States alone,
the vast majority residents of factory farms. The nearly nine billion animals includes:
approximately 33 million cattle, one million calves, 114 million hogs, 2.5 million sheep, 8.5
billion chickens, 240 million turkey, and 23 million duck. 74 For the animals, there is usually just
one exit from the factory farm, death, whether by disease or malnutrition or by slaughter. Life
inside the factory farm is characterized by overcrowding, a lack of natural light, and unsanitary
living conditions. 75 The quality of the animal’s life is also degraded due to an unnatural diet and
by the frequent administering of antibiotics and growth hormones. 76 According to Jim Mason
and Peter Singer, “Even if feed is properly formulated, some animals get inadequate diets. At
the feed mill, nutrients are added in amounts according to what the ‘average’ animal needs.
Because of stress or individual differences, some animals need more of an essential nutrient than
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they get.” 77 Nutritional deficiencies are common and can cause ailments for the animal, such as
blindness, organ damage, bone and muscle weakness, deformities, and internal bleeding. 78
Chickens were the first animals to become commoditized through practices of the factory
farm. Singer writes, “The first animal to be removed from the relatively natural conditions of
traditional farms and subjected to the full stress of modern intensive farming was the chicken.” 79
The initial step in turning the chicken from animal to commodity was confining the animal
indoors. Confinement allows an environment that can be manipulated to encourage faster
growth with a minimum of food. 80 Manipulation of lighting alters the chicken's natural
disposition. Through different stages of the chicken’s life, adjustment of the lights favor certain
behaviors or preferable biological responses. When crowding becomes a problem, the lights are
constantly dim. According to Singer, “The point of this dim lighting is to reduce the effects of
crowding. Toward the end of the eight or nine week life of the chicken, there may be as little as
half a square foot of space per chicken.” 81 In such circumstances of overcrowding, without dim
lighting, stress will often lead chickens to fight, kill, and eat one another. 82 Another common
practice employed by factory farms is de-beaking. The practice essentially is the removal of a
portion of the chicken’s beak by cutting it off with a blade. This process is intended to remedy
cannibalism and for the most part is successful, leaving chickens completely defenseless. 83
While many farmers contend that de-beaking is not painful for the chicken, Singer refutes this
contention, notably due to the exceptionally sensitive nerves in the beak. 84
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Within the factory farm, pigs endure constant and extremely close confinement.
According to Singer, “Common to all [animals] is a need for physical comfort. We have seen
that this elementary requirement is denied to hens; and, as we shall see, it is denied to pigs as
well.” 85 Both male and female pigs endure the practices of factory farming, a sow’s life is
especially harsh. After the sow is inseminated, she is locked in a narrow gestational crate, often
no greater than 18 to 24 inches in width, for nearly the entirety of her four-month pregnancy. 86
Her movement is so restricted that she is unable to turn around or walk. According to the
Humane Farming Association (HFA), “A common response shown by animals in highlystressful situations where they have little control over their environment is to perform repetitive
movements, called stereotypies.” 87 The repetitive movements of a sow confined include rubbing
their snout against the crate creating bloody and painful abscesses. 88 The sow is moved days
before she gives birth from the gestational crate to the farrowing crate. According to the HFA,
Against all her natural instincts, she must give birth to piglets, nurse them, eat, sleep,
defecate, drink, stand, and lie in the same cramped space. The nursing period is cut
drastically short by the premature separation of the piglets from their mother. The sow is
immediately re-impregnated – and sent back to an even bleaker existence in the gestation
crate. This vicious cycle is repeated over and over again until the sow’s “productivity”
wanes, and she is sent to slaughter. 89
If an American dog was subjected to the same lifestyle of a pig in the factory farming industry,
her owner could be charged with the criminal offense of animal abuse. Such factory farming
techniques however, is a common practice.
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Of all intensive livestock farming practices, the methods of raising baby calves for their
flesh stands as a sobering reminder of the cruelty that the human species can inflict on nonhuman
animals. The determining factor for the quality of calf flesh is their diet, physique, and age
resulting in flesh that is exceptionally tender and much lighter in color than other beef. Calf
flesh originated through the slaughter of very young calves, often those still nursing. 90 Modern
practices of factory farming produce flesh from calves that are older and larger, thus maximizing
profits. According to Singer,
The trick [to getting veal from older and bigger calves] depends on keeping the calf in
highly unnatural conditions. If the calf were left to grow up outside, its playful nature
would lead it to romp around the fields. Soon it would begin to develop muscles, which
would make its flesh tough. At the same time it would eat grass and its flesh would lose
the pale color that the flesh of newborn calves has. 91

The predominant approach of raising calves for the human consumption of their flesh consists of
stringent confinement and a strict diet. The calf’s removal from his or her mother occurs shortly
after birth. The practice of raising calves for veal prescribes their confinement in a small stall
where they are chained by the neck, fed a liquid diet, and all of their bedding is removed to
prevent the malnourished calves from eating it. 92 Essentially, veal calves live a short life in
confinement within a small cramped concrete stall, where the standard veal stall in the U.S. is
under two feet wide. 93 Calves remain in this cramped position for almost four months until they
are slaughtered. They have a strong desire to suckle, which cannot be satisfied, and they often
cry out for their absent mothers. 94 To maintain the pale color of the meat, the calves are fed an
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anemic diet. The practice of raising calves for veal is nearly universal, even though color of the
flesh has little effect on the taste. 95
The exploitation of nonhuman animals through the intensive agricultural practices of
factory farming shares an ominous link with the enslavement and forced servitude of persons of
color. Likewise, the connection between human and nonhuman animals in the industrialization
of slaughter also details the consequences of human dominion. Yet, as a whole, modern society
accepts the abhorrent treatment of nonhuman animals, all the while demonizing the past actions
of the Nazis or American slaveholders. Such an inconsistent perspective can be explained only
by analyzing the moral status of animals in addressing the question of what it is that separates
humans from nonhuman animals.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS

The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?
-Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles
and Morals of Legislation

The question of the moral status of the non-human animal long has haunted western
philosophy, as similar and reoccurring concepts emerge in exploring this vital question. As
philosopher Gary Steiner maintains, two of the critical questions concern the kinship between
human and nonhuman animals, as well as the capacities of nonhuman animals. Both of these
questions hold a prominent role in the establishment of the moral status of animals throughout
the discourse of Western philosophy. 1 This idea of kinship is prominent in the reflections of
Pythagoras on the animal other in the sixth century BCE. As Steiner contends, “Pythagoras
espoused an ethic of kinship with animals based on the doctrine of metempsychosis or
transmigration of souls.” 2 The metempsychosis view incorporates two positions: the first is that
the soul can be transcendent, meaning, according to Steiner, that “the capacity to ascend through
various embodiments toward ultimate liberation from embodiment.” 3 The second position holds
that the soul can move to and from other embodiments. 4 These positions historically have been
prominent in Western philosophy in considering the moral status of nonhuman animals, namely,
whether or not the soul can move between human and nonhuman animals. If the soul is
transcendental between humans and animals, the moral status of both should also be similar.
1
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The interpretation of Pythagoras’s position on animals, especially his perceived vegetarian
habits, has been attributed to both metempsychosis positions. According to Steiner, “Even if
transmigration involves only human bodies, it is still important to maintain a vegetarian diet and
to be kind to animals because these activities are conductive to the purification of the soul.” 5
The idea of kinship, however, is reflective of a much higher ethic toward animals. According to
Steiner, “If transmigration is considered to involve animal bodies as well as human bodies, then
the ethical stake on the treatment of animals becomes much higher—one could be eating or
otherwise mistreating a kindred spirit.” 6 Although Pythagoras’s true belief on the animal soul is
open to interpretation, the idea of kinship is a recurring theme in the history of philosophy and a
catalyst in deliberations on the moral status of animals.
Aristotle understands kinship to rely on the capacities of animals, or how close or distant
to one another human and nonhuman animals are positioned. 7 In regard to capacities, Aristotle’s
position might seem inherently speciesist. However, Steiner questions whether this accusation is
truly warranted:
In the zoological texts, such as History of Animals and Parts of Animals, Aristotle
attributes to animals a wide array of capabilities and in many instances appears to
attribute to them abilities that presumably require belief. In the psychological,
metaphysical, and ethical texts, particularly On the Soul and the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle offers his explicit denial that animals are capable of rationality and belief, and
he attributes to animals what appears to be a much more limited array of capacities. In
one of these latter texts Aristotle badly asserts that animals exist entirely for the sake of
human beings. This assertion has done much to cement Aristotle’s reputation as a hardline speciesist. 8
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Steiner finds the contrasting viewpoints in Aristotle’s position to rest on the focus of each set of
texts. In the first, Aristotle takes a naturalist tone wherein he attributes capacities such as
wisdom and intelligence to animals; in his latter texts, Steiner contends, he “explores the place of
human beings in the cosmos and thus his focus is on humans and the human condition, in
particular.” 9 Aristotle understands beings within the context of a hierarchy, where the gods
resided at the top, followed closely by humans, and then animals and plants. Steiner contends
that the basis of this order relies on Aristotle’s belief in eudaimonia or happiness. 10 Steiner
writes, “Aristotle is unequivocal in his commitment to the proposition that the end of human
beings is ‘happiness,’ by which he means not pleasure or material prosperity but rather a
complex ideal of moral virtue. . . . Happiness in this sense depends crucially on the capacity for
rational contemplation, which makes human beings most like the gods.” 11
The capacities of an animal are paramount in Aristotle’s position, but the Stoics take the
distinction by capacities a step further. Although Aristotle limits the divide between human and
animal in perceiving humans as a “special kind of animal,” the Stoics stretch this divide by
restricting the capabilities of the animal and drawing further distinctions between the two.
Steiner maintains, “They [the Stoics] drastically restrict the scope of animal experience and
make fundamental distinctions between even the perceptual capacities of rational and nonrational
beings. . . . In this respect, the Stoics take a decisive step beyond Aristotle, who stops short of
seeing an overarching teleology in the cosmos as a whole.” 12 It is also notable with the later
Stoics that the position of the early Stoics takes priority as the idea of divine providence becomes
engrained in Stoic thought. Steiner contends that the result was that for the first time in the
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history of Western philosophy, rationality became the signifier for moral superiority of human
animals over nonhuman animals. 13 Although there is no single idea that can be attributed to all
the Stoic thinkers, the discourse of oikeiosis, or a sense of belonging or community, emerges
from Stoic thought as a definitive element throughout the course of the movement. 14 Steiner
explains, “The doctrine of oikeiosis is a doctrine of community with an ‘all or nothing’ approach
to the question of community membership: For a given community, a specific set of capacities is
necessary and sufficient for community membership, and the nature of those capacities
determines the purpose or highest form of action for the community.” 15 The Stoic ideology of
community has remained a central theme throughout the history of Western philosophy. In the
human community, because the preeminent capacity has become rationality, and thus, nonhuman
animals have been excluded. Some humans exclude other humans whom they perceive to lack
rationality; people of color, indigenous populations, and women among others, often found [and
find] themselves on the outside of human oikeiosis.
Although the Stoics established a perspective of the animal as merely instrumental,
Plutarch, active toward the end of the Stoic movement, situates the animal in a much different
context. His embracing of Platonism led to a vegetarian lifestyle and an original defense of the
nonhuman animal. According to Steiner, “For Plutarch, what nature demands of us pertains both
to our nature and the nature of the animals that many of us are accustomed to eat: our own
spiritual purification demands that we avoid the savagery of meat eating, and the experiential
capacities of animals are sufficiently rich that the use of animals for food is a patent injustice
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against animals.” 16 A defense of animals was a rarity at the time, but when advocated the
discourse relied on human integrity, not on a heightened status for the animal self. Plutarch’s
position assumed concern for animal welfare because of the animal’s capacities and contradicted
the Stoic conception of the animal. 17 Steiner writes, “Implicit in Plutarch’s thinking is a sense of
‘naturalness,’ according to which animals possess a right to live and prosper. This sense of
naturalness confers on human beings the entitlement to use animals and the responsibility to
respect the intrinsic worth and prerogatives of animals.” 18 Plutarch constructs his case for
animals’ heightened moral status based on their “worth” and “natural dignity.” 19 In establishing
this standpoint, Plutarch points to animal capacities such as intelligence, virtues, and emotions. 20
Even given Plutarch’s intentions, he is still guilty of anthropocentrism because his claims on the
capacities of animals rely on concepts within the human experience.
Some of the early church fathers were influenced by later Stoic philosophers who denied
moral status to non-human animals. Saint Augustine, for example, exemplifies early Christian
doctrine’s absolute denial of the moral status of animals in categorically arguing that humans
“have no moral obligation whatsoever to animals.” 21 Although the Bible offers conflicting views
regarding the status of animals or human obligation to them, anthropocentric interpretations of
scripture have been the dominant position, as was the case with Saint Augustine and later Saint
Thomas Aquinas. However, the “Christian” position on animals that Aquinas and Augustine
maintained was not necessarily a reflection of a Hebrew philosophy, but was more influenced by
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Aristotle and the Stoics. 22 As Steiner notes, Jewish philosophers such as Maimonides rejected
the idea that animals existed only for human benefit, a discourse later abandoned by the early
church fathers. 23 As Steiner claims, “Writing in the fourth century, Augustine articulates a
Christian dualism according to which spiritual beings are fundamentally superior to physical
ones. 24 Augustine contends, “Among living things, the sentient are placed above those which do
not have sensation: animals above trees, for instance. And, among the sentient, the intelligent
are placed above those which do not have intelligence; men for example, are above cattle. And
among the intelligent, the immortal, such as the angels, are placed above the mortal, such as
men.” 25 Augustine’s hierarchy shares an almost exact similarity to what Aristotle proposed, with
the exception that the immortals at the top are named something different. In his position, Saint
Thomas Aquinas shares similarities with Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine holding a similar
viewpoint that animals have been placed here for human use. Of Aquinas’s position, Steiner
writes, “The ‘less noble’ creatures exist ‘for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than
man exist for the sake of man.’ Beings that are ‘more noble’ stand in closer proximity to God, in
virtue of their rational capacity for self-determination.” 26 In both the philosophies of Augustine
and Aquinas, similar to that of Aristotle, capacities separate humans and animals and constitute
animals as less. Most often this lacking capacity is rationality.
Immanuel Kant, too, carries on the philosophical tradition of anthropocentrism through
his ethical theory of deontology. Kant contends that for one to constitute a moral obligation or be
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a recipient of it, they must qualify as a person. 27 On Kant’s perspective, Steiner contends, “A
person is a being ‘whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which as an end in
itself could be a ground of determinate laws. To be a ground of determinate laws is to be capable
of adducing and contemplating the moral law for oneself; it is to be capable of legislating the law
of respect and following the law that one has legislated.” 28 Because the nonhuman animal lack
the capabilities to adduce and contemplate moral law, Kant deems them a “thing,” that therefore
can be used as a means to human desire. 29 Kant’s perspective essentially objectified the animal
self and confirmed a belief system that appropriated the nonhuman animal as object and the
human animal as subject. Although Kant distances himself from a theological discourse, he uses
capacities to distinguish and divide humans from animals.
Perhaps no other belief system contributed more to the nonhuman animal’s lowered
status than the pre-Enlightenment ideology of Cartesian dualism. 30 Dualism holds that the
separation between mind and body differentiate humans and animals. Dualism has also been
crucial in justifying dominion for some groups of people and excusing the oppression of the
other. Cartesian dualism or Descartes’ substance dualism is a modern version of the ancient
philosophical conceptions of dualism. 31 Substance dualism holds that there are two kinds of
substance: physical matter and mind. Howard Robinson explains,
Descartes believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential
property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it
thinks. . . . Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the
27
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properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except
where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own
right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling
levers' in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. 32
Using the idea of substance dualism, Descartes concluded that while humans possessed both
types of matter, the mechanical body as well as the mind to control it, the mind was absent in the
nonhuman animal. The perceived absence of the mind in the animal led him to the conclusion
that animals were mere matter, only mechanical bodies.
Strachan Donnelley’s article on organic existence provides an explanation of human
knowledge that essentially led to the factory farm and the overall depreciation of nature due to
Cartesian dualism. Donnelley contends that Cartesian assumptions have little viability in
differentiating the animal and human. According to Donnelley, “Research centered on organic
existence and individuality employs a methodology that merges science and philosophy,
pertinent in differentiating animals and human beings, or substantiating whether or not animals
should be ethically considered. Almost every ethical perspective is built on the foundation of the
individual or self.” 33
Every ethical theory, Donnelley contends, is contingent on individual action and the
perspectives that govern those actions. If human obligation to animals is indeed warranted,
several aspects of the human and animal need to be understood. The first is that human animals,
in common with non-human animals, are individual organisms. 34 According to Donnelley, “To
bring together and to elucidate our ethical responsibilities to humans, animals, and animate
nature, we need a common philosophic understanding of ‘organic individuality:’ its nature and
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ethical significance.” 35 Cartesian dualism provides an interpretation of organic individuality in
relation to metaphysics. Descartes’ division of mind and body stood as two self-regulating
elements of world reality, thus setting a fixed point that formed a knowledge base contributing to
philosophical and scientific thinking alike. 36 In dualism, reality consists of the mind and the
body, which is only an extension of the mind.37 Essentially, dualism contends that animals are
just a body, a shell; the individual then implies mind and thought. 38 In this sense, dualism
deemphasizes nature and with it nonhuman animals, as well as some humans historically labeled
as unevolved or as a species different from white humans. According to Donnelley, “Nature was
rendered a mere dynamic, causal, mechanistic, and material affair, ‘mere matter in motion.” 39
This viewpoint on nature contributed to a major separation of human and animal that created a
hierarchy of perspectives, and allowed for the continued marginalization of animals through the
justification of their use to satisfy the desires of humans. Obviously, such an outlook remains
prevalent in Western culture with the practices of factory farming and vivisection, relatively
modern institutions of animal oppression.
Countering the philosophy of Cartesian dualism is the idea of organic individualism,
which points to the presence of a connection between an animal’s body and their ontology of
existence. 40 Donnelley contends that it is the fragility and finiteness of the living organic form
(the body) that constitutes the existence of self, identity, and individuality. 41 This notion is
contingent on what humans acknowledge as the state of being. 42 “Being” would seem to imply
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action of one who is alive recognizing the life of another, as well as consciousness or selfawareness from one’s own ontological perspective. 43 To clarify this idea, when humans see a
nonhuman animal, they recognize this state of being within the animal self as a reflection of their
own “beingness.” According to Donnelley,
We know what it means to be self-concerned or "internally related" to ourselves: to have
our own individual being as an insistent practical issue, which must be decided by our
own activity in the world (for example, in breathing, eating, seeking shelter, or avoiding
enemies). These primordial existential and worldly experiences natively equip us with the
experiential means or epistemic arsenal to judge the quick from the dead, the animate
from the inanimate. 44

Organic existence implies a certain criterion, an active merger between body and mind, where
self, the organic living, is manifested through the physical body in possession with the inanimate
mind; only through a conversion of both, is organic existence possible. 45 Organic existence
implies two major ideas that are relevant in an examination of the factory farm. First, it rejects
the philosophy of dualism. Although factory farming is a modern embodiment of dualist thought
that relegates the animal to status of “thing”, animals are not merely mechanical objects to be
used as humans wish. The entire concept of organic individuality elevates the presence of
animal awareness. When animals suffers through pain or stress, an awareness exists of their
circumstances within their self. Organic individuality posits a connection between human and
nonhuman animals in both the recognition of the animate in each other and in the shared
recognition of finiteness. To understand the extent of suffering initiated by the practice of
factory farming and, indeed, to compare it to human suffering aids in better appreciating the
suffering of another. Understanding the practices that cause such suffering as well as an ethical
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standard in regard to animals is necessary. Should humans care about animal suffering because
nonhuman animals, like human animals, should be attributed certain rights, or should concern for
animal suffering derive simply because animals, too, can suffer?
Philosophers Peter Singer and Tom Regan differ from one another in establishing the
moral status of animals. Singer applies a utilitarian ethical theory in his moral consideration of
animals, but Tom Regan utilizes rights theory to lessen the moral divide between human and
nonhuman animals. In explicating Singer’s position, an explanation of the basic assumptions of
utilitarian theory is necessary. Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, was an early
proponent of animal welfare and accepted a consequentialist ethical perspective to confront the
moral status of animals. In An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham
discussed his theory of utilitarianism, promoting it as one that valued both humans and animals.
His belief that humans have an obligation to consider animal welfare is evidenced in the
following passage. According to Bentham,
Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the
insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of thing. . . . The day has
been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the
species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated. . . .upon the same footing
as. . . .animals are still. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of the
legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse?
But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose
the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor,
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? 46
In the above passage, Bentham makes a significant claim regarding the ethical consideration for
animals: limited rationality should not exclude animals from ethical consideration. This notable
claim relies on the foundation of suffering as the principal criterion for ethical consideration.
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Bentham questions the assertion that only beings of reason are entitled to ethical consideration;
his strongest point, however, is that lack of rationality alone should not exclude a being from
having moral status, but that, instead, the ability to suffer is of concern. For the utilitarian, pain
and pleasure are of equal importance in measuring utility, the foundation of utilitarian
ethics. Instances of pleasure are valued positively, contributing to an increase in utility, while
instances of pain are valued negatively, subtracting from the net value of an action’s
consequences. Because nonhuman animals can experience pain and suffering, utilitarianism as
Bentham envisioned, extends ethical consideration to nonhuman animals. 47
Like Bentham, philosopher John Stuart Mill was a prominent contributor to utilitarian
theory. In Utilitarianism, Mill expands on Bentham’s ideas, clarifying utilitarian theory.
According to Mill, “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ as the
‘greatest-happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.” 48
Utilitarian theory focuses on the consequences of an action, rather than the motivation for it.
This means utilitarianism focuses on the product of an action (whether an action produces
pleasure or pain). The right (moral) action, then, is the one that produces the greatest amount of
happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number.
The idea of right action brings up a very important question, one that is central to the
consideration of the treatment of animals. If right action produces the greatest happiness and
least suffering for the greatest number, does this apply to nonhuman animals or only to people?
Although Mill and Bentham differ on several key features of utilitarianism, according to Mark
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Timmons, “Both accepted the following two claims: Welfare is identical with happiness and
happiness is identical with pleasure and the absence of pain.” 49 If a utilitarian were to base
ethical decision making on choices that maximize utility, he/she would need to be able to
measure pleasure and the absence of pain. For this, Bentham developed what he called felicific
calculus, a system to measure specific instances of pleasure and pain. The system calculates
utility by evaluating seven features for which pleasure and pain are measured. 50 Bentham’s
calculus consisted of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent. Of
his seven features, Bentham put the greatest emphasis on intensity and duration and thus viewed
instances of pleasure or pain through the quantity of the intensity and duration of the sensation. 51
Bentham’s felicific calculus could be implemented by using the established quantity-based
criteria and assigning a numerical value to instances of pleasure and pain, to thus institute a
uniform value-based measurement system. Theoretically, Bentham’s felicific calculus could
distinguish actions that promote the highest degree of utility even in situations where an action
could affect a great number of people differently. 52 What makes utilitarianism such a good
ethical theory in regard to animals and the factory farm is its concept of hedonism, which is the
foundation of utilitarian theory. Hedonism prescribes that pleasure, happiness, and welfare are
all essentially the same and that pain and suffering negatively affect them. Therefore,
utilitarianism promotes actions that maximize pleasure for the greatest number of those who can
experience pleasure and minimize pain for those who can experience pain. Bentham’s emphasis
on duration and intensity as measurements of pleasure and pain provides strong evidence that
utilitarianism is an ethical theory that includes any species that can suffer.
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Expanding on many of the same ideas Bentham developed, Peter Singer provides an even
more convincing case for the elevated status of nonhuman animals. Singer contends that animals
are not due only ethical consideration, but also equal consideration in interests. Singer’s
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, in essence, stands as a modern form of
consequentialism. According to Singer, “The essence of the principle . . . is that we give equal
weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions. This
means that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act, and if X stands to lose more than
Y stands to gain, it is better not to do the act.” 53 Singer’s principle gains emphasis when applied
to the factory farm, animals, and the human beneficiaries of the practice. Factory farmers raise
animals for their flesh, to satisfy consumers’ demand for low-cost meat and increased profits for
the producer. Animals becomes victims of factory farming’s dependency on space and cost.
Animals in the factory farm are forced into confinement for most of their lives in dirty and dark
places and consume unnatural food injected with growth hormones to spur exceedingly fast
maturation. Concerning Singer’s principle, the human gain is consistent with the pleasure of
taste from the meat and the cost effectiveness that allows humans to indulge their tastes. The
losses for the animals, however, are consistent with a life of suffering and eventual death. In
regard for Singer’s principle, do animals stand to lose more than humans stand to gain through
the practice of factory farming? If animals are indeed worth equal consideration, then their
losses definitively outweigh the trivial human gains. The assessment of gains and losses from
factory farming become evident when considering the veal calves who live a short life of
suffering (losses) in order to satisfy the pleasure of taste (gains) for humans. Singer’s principle
weighs the interests of both parties and establishes that the losses in this situation outweigh the
gains.
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The validity of Singer’s principle lies in his contention that animal interests warrant equal
consideration to human interests. To validate this claim, Singer must show that animals are due
equal consideration of interests. According to Singer, “If [sic] humans are to be regarded as
equal only to one another, we need some sense of ‘equal’ that does not require any actual,
descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other qualities.” 54 Essentially, Singer’s argument is
this: If all humans and only humans deserve complete and equal moral status, then there has to
be some attribute that all humans and only humans possess. Any attribute that only humans
have, some humans lack, and any attribute that all humans possess, most, and at least some,
animals possess. An opponent of equal consideration for humans and animals might argue that
equal consideration is not warranted because animals cannot reason or possess morals, as do
humans. Singer contests this counter claim because some humans cannot reason or some possess
few morals. He, like Bentham, points to infants or humans with severe mental defects (e.g.,
humans in a vegetative state, those afflicted by severe mental illness, or mentally handicapped
humans) as examples. 55 In both cases, however, the potential of the human animal remains
unacknowledged. What should be said of the potential capacities that the irrational infant will
have as he/she matures? In accounting for human potential, Singer highlights the permanently
mentally handicapped human as someone who has never, and will never, possess these human
specific attributes. According to Singer,
Philosophers who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans from other
animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans by lumping them in
with the other animals. It is easy to see why they do not. To take this line without
rethinking our attitudes to other animals would entail that we have the right to perform
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painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that
we had the right to rear and kill these humans for food. 56

What Singer claims is that humans marginalize and use other animals as they see fit, because
they see them as inferior due to their assumed lack of reason and rationality; however, they do
not hold this same position in regard to humans who lack these same skills. Moreover, Singer
further refutes claims against equal consideration on the basis of the possession of traits such as
reasoning or moral awareness, because such assertions would allow humans to justify giving
higher consideration to certain groups of humans, such as those who are highly intelligent in
preference to those of low intelligence. 57
Regan, who prefers a rights discourse to utilitarianism in positioning the moral status of
animals, challenges Singer’s Equal Consideration of Interests Principle on the basis of flaws in
utilitarian theory. Regan’s argument against Singer’s principle of equal interests provides a
sound examination of Singer’s theory and its relationship to factory farming. His counter
argument directly attacks the validity of utilitarianism as an ethical theory in considering
animals. According to Regan,
It is unclear how, as a utilitarian, he can argue that we have a moral obligation to stop
supporting the practice of raising animals intensively (henceforth symbolized as p)
because of some statement about the purpose of p. The question the utilitarian must
answer is not, (a) what is the purpose of p [factory farming]? It is, (b) All things
considered, what are the consequences of p [factory farming], and how do they compare
to the value of the consequences that would result if alternatives to p were adopted and
supported?”58
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Regan’s criticism of Singer’s principle contends: First, utilitarianism does not give animals’
intrinsic value in and of themselves. Instead, as Regan notes, even if alternatives are adopted
replacing factory farming, animals could still be used for human consumption. An example of
this would be “free-range” animals slaughtered for human consumption. Singer must also
confront Regan’s assertion that despite the principle’s grounding in utilitarian thought, it does
not follow the approach of consequentialism. 59 As Regan contends, although the purpose (a) of
factory farming (p) is substantiated, a utilitarian must account for (b) the consideration of all
entities involved as well as the potential consequences of factory farming (p) and how they
compare in value to the consequences that would result if alternatives to factory farming (p) were
adopted and supported. 60 Arguing from the perspective of a utilitarian, Regan analyzes the
consequences that could result if the factory farm was replaced by another practice. According
to Regan, “His [Singer’s] characterization also leaves out much which, from a utilitarian point of
view must be judged to be highly relevant to determining the morality of p.” 61 Regan argues,
essentially, that Singer fails to account for all the consequences and interests involved in factory
farming. According to Regan, “There are, first and most obviously, those who actually raise and
sell the animals; but there are many others…whose lives revolve around the success or failure of
the animal industry.” 62 Regan also acknowledges the family members of workers employed in
the industry who would be affected if intensive farming practices were abandoned. Regan
writes, “Now, the interests which these persons have in ‘business-as-usual,’ in raising animals
intensively, go well beyond pleasures of taste and are far from trivial. 63 Regan is correct in his
assumption that if Singer’s principle is justified on the grounds of utilitarianism, then all the
59

Ibid., 310.
Ibid.
61
Ibid., 310-311.
62
Ibid.
63
Regan, “Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism and Animal Rights,” 310-311.
60

65

consequences to the action of abandoning factory farming must be considered. But this is only
one reason why Regan supports a rights discourse.
Regan’s assessment that all consequences must be considered in Singer’s principle of
equal interests is valid; however, in considering all the consequences, Singer can still maintain
his original perspective that his principle would deem factory farming as a wrong action. Regan
acknowledges that a utilitarian must investigate fully all the consequences and all entities
affected by an action. 64 My response to Regan’s criticism of Singer is that he misses a crucial
point within Singer’s principle. If utilitarianism defines right action as the one that produces the
greatest amount of happiness and least amount of suffering for the greatest number, Singer’s
principle is still satisfactory as an argument against factory farming. Regan’s assessment that
Singer does not consider all the consequences of ending factory farming for all the humans
involved does not matter. When examining the figures presented earlier in this chapter, in 2009
alone, nine billion animals in the United States endured some degree of suffering before being
slaughtered for human consumption and 98 percent were products of factory farms. 65 Based on
Singer’s principle, even if every single American suffers negative effects by ending factory
farming, the number would still pale in comparison to the substantial number of animals who
suffer and are killed every year in the factory farm and slaughterhouse. Given the emphasis on
utility as a significant component of utilitarian theory, Singer’s principle works well, both as a
theory for the ethical consideration of animals and as a valid utilitarian argument.
In regard to factory farming and other instances of episodic animal oppression, there are
many more animals who stand to lose than humans stand to gain, even with every American
human being considered. But what if one applies Singer’s principle of equal consideration of
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interests outside of factory farming to, for example, vivisection, that is, medical experimentation
on animals? Vivisection is still an oppressive practice, yet in considering future generations of
humans who might benefit from a medical breakthrough, based, at least in part, on animal
experimentation and suffering, under Singer’s principle vivisection could be morally justified. It
is for circumstances such as this that Regan prefers a rights discourse regarding the treatment of
animals. Although Singer maintains a direct duty view, a position that asserts humans have at
least some direct duties to animals, it falls short of giving them rights. 66
In The Case for Animal Rights, Regan offers his argument on the superiority of a rights
discourse over other ethical approaches in elevating the moral status of animals. Regan’s
principal claim is that animals as moral agents possess certain basic moral rights. 67 According to
Regan,
To say that these individuals possess certain rights independently of anyone’s voluntary
acts, either their own or those of others, and independently of the position they happen to
occupy in any given institutional arrangement; these rights are universal—that is, they are
possessed by all relevantly similar individuals. . .all who possess these rights possess
them equally. . . The principal basic moral right possessed by all moral agents and
patients is the right to respectful treatment. . . All moral agents and patients must always
be treated in ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of
value of this kind. 68

Regan’s position predicates the moral status of animals on a basis similar to that of humans.
Both possess certain basic rights that protect them against the violation of these rights by others.
This means that violation of rights cannot be morally justified and is, indeed, a morally wrong
action. Regan’s position also establishes that moral agents who possess these basic rights are
inherently valuable, meaning that moral agents who share this value “must always be treated in
66
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ways that are consistent with the recognition of their equal possession of value of this kind.” 69
This differs from Singer’s position in that his principle of equal consideration of interests,
consistent with utilitarian theory, affords animals intrinsic value founded on the pleasure
principle. The problem Regan has with this claim is that with their value deriving from the
pleasure principle, animals have no value in and of themselves. 70 This is problematic because
certain circumstances might negate the utility of pleasure and promote pain and suffering in
favor of higher order pleasures. 71 Some cases of vivisection that benefit human animals could
morally justify the suffering of nonhuman animals.
Rights discourse, however, is not without its own contradictions. The most glaring
problem the animal rights position must confront is that it is guilty of the problems it attempts to
remedy. One such difficulty is that rights discourse is inherently speciesist even though it claims
not be so. The reason for this contradiction rests on the extension of rights. Should rights be
extended to what is considered lower ordered animals, such as mice? To insects? To amoebas?
At some point, a line has to be drawn, favoring some species over others. There is obviously a
significant degree of difference between primates and insects, but without differentiating
between the two, how can rights discourse effectively value one species over the other? Unlike
Singer, who uses the existence of pain and suffering as the catalyst to extend his principle of
equal consideration of interests, Regan and other rights-based philosophers must draw an
imaginary line within the animal kingdom separating species who are attributed rights and those
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who are not. Is this not the same methodology grounded within anthropocentric ideology, which
draws an imaginary line dividing the status of humans and other animals? 72
In his book History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence, Dominick LaCapra
questions the human—animal divide and in doing so, the shortcomings of rights discourse.
In his call for a new paradigm that departs from anthropocentrism, LaCapra points out the
inadequacies of attributing rights to certain groups, but not to others. Rights discourse is
understood as a fundamental claim where sovereignty has no bearing or is indeed outside of
sovereignty. 73 So, if nonhuman animals are attributed certain rights or claims, they are outside
of human dominion and, therefore, their rights should not be infringed upon. Yet, as LaCapra
specifies, rights discourse has its limits. According to the author,
Whatever the strategic necessity of an appeal to rights in the current context of law and
ethical debate, the limitations of ‘rights discourse’ suggest that one rethink the entire
issue and displace the notion of rights in the direction of competing claims, in good part
to take distance from predictable, conventional expectations, such as the requirement of a
mutual implication or even a strict reciprocity of right and duty or obligation that prompts
the question—often the rhetorical question—of whether a dog or a cat can have
obligations to counterbalance putative ‘rights’. 74
LaCapra details a significant conundrum of rights discourse, that of mutuality. Rights essentially
can be honored or reciprocated by some beings who are attributed rights, but others beings,
including some humans and animals, cannot recognize these rights or cannot share in an
obligation to respect them. How can a certain set of rights transcend species, ability, age, and so
on, yet be applied to each and all mutually if an obligation to maintain these rights does not exist
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in all entities? The lack of mutuality limits rights discourse and makes applying rights,
especially to those who may not possess obligation, a convoluted, if not impossible, endeavor.
Such glaring errors in rights discourse confound the problem of the human—animal divide and
although Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests is not without its own problems,
reliance on a shared vulnerability (that is, suffering) unites human and animal at the core of
being.

70

CHAPTER 5
HUMAN SLAVERY, ANIMAL SLAVERY: A NECESSARY COMPARISON

We had very bad eatin'. Bread, meat, water. And they fed it to us in a trough, jes' like the
hogs. . . . And the flo' in ouah cabin was dirt, and at night we'd jes' take a blanket and lay
down on the flo'. The dog was supe'ior to us; they would take him in the house.
-Richard Toler, American Slave Narratives

More than three decades before Topsy’s arrival in America and prior to her becoming
property of Adam Forepaugh’s circus, another showman attempting to establish footing in the
business, purchased his first act, but it was not an elephant or any other non-human animal for
that matter, but instead a former Kentucky slave woman, too old and feeble to be of benefit to
her master. Years of hardships had rendered her body useless and broken, but her price was
affordable. 1 Unable to pay the hefty cost and upkeep of an elephant, the nearly penniless
entrepreneur would have to settle for the old slave woman. She would come to be known as
Joice Heth, the fabricated 161-year-old nurse of George Washington. 2 The young entrepreneur
who staged the exhibit and claimed ownership over the woman was P.T. Barnum, one of
America’s first and most famous showman. According to Michael Daly, “Barnum began by
exhibiting her in New York, describing himself as ‘proprietor of the negress’ even though
slavery had been abolished in that state seven years before.” 3 Similar to the circus elephants of
the day, Heth would not receive any of the profits earned, despite Barnum raking in $1,500 a
week from the exhibit. 4
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Attendance would eventually drop as public fascination dwindled. But Barnum devised a
scheme to regain the former luster of Heth. According to Daly,
Barnum provided an early example of his particular genius when he planted a letter in a
Boston newspaper signed only “A visitor” stating that the exhibit was “a humbug,” but
the truth was “vastly more interesting.” “The fact is, Jocie Heth is not a human being,”
the letter went on. “What purports to be remarkably old woman, is simply a curiously
constructed automaton, made up of whalebone, India-rubber, and numerous springs that
are ingeniously put together, and made to move at the slightest touch according to the
will of the operator.” 5
Barnum’s ploy was a success as visitors again poured in to witness the spectacle. When Heth
finally died, having earned Barnum his original investment back several times over, he again
sought one last opportunity to squeeze more profit out of her. Daly writes, “He announced a
public autopsy and 1,500 people paid fifty cents each to squeeze in the City Saloon in Manhattan
and watch prominent surgeon Dr. David Rogers dissect her. Rogers determined that she had not
been much more than eighty, or half the age advertised.” 6 The woman’s true identity would
never be known. Did she have a family? Anyone who would have missed her or grieved her
death? In the end, she probably lived as she had died, spectacularly obscure, absent of any true
identity and hidden away in a nation that viewed her and others of her likeness as nothing more
than property. She might have been Barnum’s first victim, but she would not be his last. As the
show grew and Barnum was able to afford and acquire his own performing animals, assuredly
many met a fate similar to that of the slave woman: a lifelong inferior status, a destitute
existence, and an abundance of suffering within the grasp of dominion.
American culture, forging an association between black humans and nonhuman animals,
has been entangled in an epidemic of racism and speciesism throughout its history. However
unpopular the comparison, these linkages cannot be undone, as the oppression of each has been
5
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shared through several pivotal features: the constructed belief that distinguishes both black
persons and non-human animals as marginal, the procedural course oppression follows, and the
analogous details within episodic oppression that victimizes both the nonhuman and human
animal alike. Chapter Two suggested a theory of oppression for the first two aspects of
comparison in the oppression of animals, persons of color, and women, but this chapter will
account for the explicit similarities in the oppression of some groups of humans and the
continued oppression of animals. With an emphasis on Marjorie Spiegel’s work The Dreaded
Comparison and David Brion Davis’s book Inhuman Bondage, this chapter traces the similarities
between human and animal oppression, specifically, the enslavement and oppression of blacks
by connecting their oppression to that of nonhuman animals.
Spiegel opens The Dreaded Comparison with a historical explanation for the oppression
of blacks and establishes that the justifications used today for oppressing nonhuman animals are
similar to those used to defend the enslavement of blacks for centuries. Spiegel acknowledges
that most people today accept that the enslavement of black humans was wrong, but in retrospect
to animals concludes, “We cannot maintain that oppression is fine for some simply because they
are not like us.” 7 Spiegel transitions from the historical foundations of oppression to the
parallels between human and animal slavery.
For this chapter, it is paramount to provide an encompassing definition of slavery and its
link to New World slavery practices. The concept of slavery, as it is understood today, is
associated with the bondage or forced servitude of humans. Scholarship on slavery in North
America centers on enslavement of black persons (and to some extent, that of Native Americans)
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from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, with an emphasis on slavery in the
American South. But slavery overall escapes an easy definition, as its meaning has varied across
societies and time, and the institution historically takes many different meanings. As Stanley
Engerman notes in his article, “Slavery at Different Times and Places,” “Slavery has been one of
the most ubiquitous of human institutions, and has existed in many places. It has been present in
societies dominated by all major religions and ideologies, and had legally lasted in some places
into the second half of the twentieth century-if not more informally in places until the present
day.” 8
If slavery can be defined, Engerman says three issues must be addressed. First, as
already alluded to, slavery is not unique to any one group, place, or time. 9 Second, Engerman
writes, “Slavery, when it existed, should not be examined in isolation from other institutions and
happenings at that or other times. Thus it is important to trace the various linkages of slavery
with the nonslave aspects of different societies.” 10 And last, it must be acknowledged that the
lines between slavery and what is thought as legitimate labor and social systems have become
blurred. 11 According to Engerman, “Any specific definition of slavery has legal, cultural,
political, and economic aspects.” 12 Engerman contends slavery is also used as a metaphor,
which further complicates the definition. If the meaning of slavery constitutes all episodes of
oppression, then all instances of non-slavery could be seen as freedom, but this only convolutes
what it means to be free and neglects all the variable states between slavery and freedom.
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In grasping the similarities and distinctions of slavery in his book Inhuman Bondage: The
Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World, David Brion Davis iterates that the modern
conception of slavery may lie in its premodern foundations. Davis examines the Tupinamba, an
aboriginal tribe residing off the coast of Brazil at first European contact. Davis contends, “We
find that the Tupinamba, like many primitive slaveholding peoples, had no economic need for
slave labor. Food was abundant as a result of the hunting done by males and the gathering as
well as slash-and-burn planting and harvesting done by women.” 13 Yet, the Tupinamba who
were often at war with neighboring tribes, enslaved their captives for a period of time, before
murdering and eating them as part of a ritual. 14 Davis notes that for hunting-and-gathering
peoples, taking captives in war was not unusual; however, the male captives were almost always
immediately killed and the female captives were either killed or assimilated into the tribe. 15
But the practice of holding slaves for the Tupinamba did serve a purpose. As Davis
notes,
As the foreign slaves lived and worked with their captors, they were constantly required
to humble themselves and show respect to their conquerors. Thus the function of slavery,
as in many societies, was to make the Tupinamba feel honored, superior, or almost
godlike and they defined themselves as “nonslaves.” It was only in ancient Greece and
Rome that “nonslave” began to mean “free” in our individualistic sense.
The Tupinamba, prior to executing and consuming their slaves, first humiliated them,
condemned their tribes, and entered into a game where they allowed them to escape, only to
recapture them. 16 The entirety of this ritual serves as a profound instance of the past converging
with the present. Davis elaborates,
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It is crucial to realize that such slaves were being treated essentially as animals, a fact
symbolized by their ritualistic slaughter and the final cannibal feast. This behavior
dramatizes the point that, wholly apart from later economic functions, slaves from the
very beginning were perceived as dehumanized humans—humans deprived of precisely
those traits and faculties that are prerequisites for human dignity, respect, and honor. 17
The Tupinamba share fascinating linkages to American slaveholders as they not only
seem to embrace the idea of dominion, but also recognize it and seek ways to exhibit it. Davis
draws further linkages between the practices of the Tupinamba and the American lynching of
blacks. According to Davis, “That modern Americans have not been so far removed from the
Tupinamba in a moral or even ritualistic sense can be seen in the enthusiasm for lynching former
slaves and their descendants a century ago.” 18 The lynch mobs might not have eaten their
victims as the Tupinamba did, Davis points out, but southern whites gathered body parts from
the victim as souvenirs. 19 One such example occurred in Paris, Texas, in 1893, when ten
thousand whites gathered to lynch Henry Smith, a former slave accused of raping and murdering
a young white girl in an act perpetrated, “in the mad wantonness of gorilla ferocity.” 20 Davis
describes the scene,
High on a platform, so the men, women, and children could see the torture of Smith, the
father and brother of the dead girl applied white-hot irons to Smith’s bare feet and tongue
before burning out his eyes. One observer recalled, “a cry that echoed over the prairie
like the wail of a wild animal”. . . .After the platform had been soaked with oil and set
ablaze. . . .people raked the ashes to acquire “nigger” buttons, bones, and teeth as relics.
As with the Tupinamba, we find ritual sacrifice, consecrated by fire, designed to purge
society of the ultimate domestic enemy. 21
Even though the purification by fire in Tupinamba slavery and in southern lynching practices
share similarities, another link to these episodes of oppression can be observed in the modern
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slavery of animals in the factory farm, where after dismemberment, animal flesh is burned to
purify the segmented parts for consumption.
The burning and dismemberment as part of lynching practices detailed in newspaper
articles published as recent as the twentieth century transpired less than four decades after the
1865 abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. One
such account recorded in the Chicago Record-Herald on May 23, 1902, details the capture and
murder of African-American Dudley Morgan in Lansing, Texas, the day prior. According to the
report, after being accused of assaulting the wife of a section foreman, a mob of 4,000 seized
Morgan from police custody and dragged him to the outskirts of town. Mob members bound
him with rope, tortured him with burning pine timbers driven into his eyes, and then burned him
alive. 22 The report states, “As the fire died down relic hunters started their search for souvenirs.
Parts of the skull and body were carried away. The men who captured Morgan were then held
above the heads of the mob while their pictures were taken.” 23 In another account, a black
couple from Doddsville, Mississippi, Luther Holbert and his wife, accused of murder, while on
the run were captured by a mob. Their capture concluded a four-day chase involving 200 men
and two packs of bloodhounds. 24 According to an eyewitness report in the Vicksburg Evening
Post on February 8, 1904,
When the two Negroes were captured, they were tied to trees and while the funeral pyres
were being prepared, they were forced to hold out their hands while one finger at a time
was chopped off. The fingers were distributed as souvenirs. The ears of the murderers
were cut off. Holbert was beaten severely, his skull was fractured and one of his eyes,
knocked out with a stick, hung by a shred from the socket. Some of the mob used a large
corkscrew to bore into the flesh of the man and woman. It was applied to their arms, legs
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and body, then pulled out, the spirals tearing out big pieces of raw quivering flesh every
time it was withdrawn. 25
According to statistics provided by the archives at Tuskegee Institute, from 1882 until
1964, 3,445 lynchings of blacks took place in the United States. 26 In the period from 1891 until
1901, over 100 blacks were lynched in every year, except for two. 27 These numbers reveal an
alarming number of lynchings taking place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
Even though these reports provide two examples of a common southern practice of
lynching blacks even after the abolition of slavery, this savage ritual perhaps shares an indirect
linkage with the slavery practices of the Tupinamba. However, the taking of dismembered body
parts as trophies is also a reoccurring tradition in hunting. It is a common practice in deer
hunting to dismember the dead buck so that the head may be taken for mounting. As Spiegel
notes, “It is not surprising that in the highly stylized hunts of the British upper classes, which
have remained virtually unchanged for centuries, one finds close parallels to the hunting of
slaves in the Southern United States.” 28 These parallels are evidence of the reinforcement of
dominion and continue to be recognized in the training and use of dogs to hunt both human and
animal prey, and the dismemberment of the captured body, and the keeping of segments as
trophies. 29 The slavery practices of the Tupinamba, more than anything else, established not out
of necessity, but for the expression of their dominance. The profitability of both human and
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animal slavery in America undoubtedly influenced its establishment in the New World and the
continuance of the practice, but a desire for power and control cannot be dismissed as factors in
the presence and persistence of both human and animal slavery.
The model for human slavery in New World societies also shares foundational
associations with the domestication of animals. 30 Davis claims, “Slavery may well have been
modeled on the domestication of animals, especially livestock and beasts of burden (i.e.,
‘chattel,’ from the medieval Latin capitale [and Latin capitalis], which was the root for both
‘cattle’ and ‘capital’).” 31 In solidifying the association between the domestication of animals and
development of human slavery, Davis acknowledges one definitive element that both share, that
is, both human slaves and animals are assumed to be property. Harvard sociologist Orlando
Patterson dismisses this claim, in defining slavery as, “the permanent, violent domination of
natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” 32 In his review of Patterson’s book Slavery
and Social Death, V.P. Franklin writes, Patterson’s “definition is significant both for what it
includes and does not include as part of the cultural baggage of the enslaved.” 33 One such
exclusion, as Franklin notes, is the reference to slaves as property. According to Franklin,
“Patterson. . . .believes that ‘to define slavery only as the treatment of human beings as property
fails as a definition, since it does not really specify any distinct category of persons.’” 34
Patterson’s exclusion of proprietary claims in defining slavery is reasonable, yet one can also
object to his definition. If he is going to limit slavery to only those instances concerning
“persons,” he must be able to define personhood. Davis seems to imply in linking human slavery
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to animal domestication that personhood cannot be used as an identifier of slavery because the
institution of slavery itself essentially dehumanizes the human. The credibility of Patterson’s
definition of slavery, which excludes any mention of a relegated status to property, rests on an
absent definition of personhood. Davis constructs a similar objection when he states, “I would
modify Patterson’s view of slavery in two ways. . . .I would restore the crucial element of chattel
property. . . .The key to this relationship, as I have suggested, lies in the ‘animalization’ or
‘bestialization’ of slaves.” 35 Although Davis’s claim reiterates the devalued status of animals,
the linkages between human and animal slavery are undeniable.
The relegation of the human slave to the status of animal predominated in America
before, during, and even after the height of slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
As Spiegel notes, “Because society’s opinion of animals was so low, racist authors and antiabolitionists propagandized against blacks by comparing them to negative stereotypes of nonhuman animals.” 36 Spiegel points to several animal names such as monkey, ape, fox, buck, and
coon that were historically used to demean blacks. 37 Frequently-used stereotypes of black
people within American literature have relied on the stereotypes of animals. According to
Spiegel, “Reality was blindly ignored by these authors as they churned out banalities of savage
apes and lewd, promiscuous beasts. . . .Some authors, such as H.R. Helper in his book Nojuque
(1867), set up “black” and “beastly” as exact synonyms. 38 Criticism of these comparisons, while
warranted, might have dispelled some of the negative connotations associated with blacks, but
also reinforced the antagonistic perspectives toward animals. 39 Spiegel continues, “So ‘beastly’
are animals considered, that to be like one implies the worst, that you are bad. It would logically
35
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follow that a person who is unlike an animal must by definition be good.” 40 The attribution of
animal qualities to black persons, however, served a purpose even more than deemphasizing
their human qualities; it also upheld the idea that black persons, like animals, were uncivilized
and wild and therefore needed, and perhaps even desired, a master for guidance. This suggestion
is at the core of Davis’s contention that New World slavery was molded after the domestication
of animals in ancient times.
Although the first historically-documented existence of slavery comes out of
Mesopotamia around 2000 B.C.E. in Sumerian society, the domestication of animals coincided
with an agricultural shift from hunting-and-gathering communities to agricultural societies some
six thousand years earlier. 41 Although dogs had been domesticated for nearly two thousand
years prior to other animal species, Davis writes,
It was only with the Neolithic Revolution (some ten thousand years ago) that sheep,
cattle, pigs, horses, goats, and other social animals were domesticated, consequently
undergoing an evolutionary process called neoteny, or progressive juvenilization. In
other words, the domesticated animals became more submissive than their wild
counterparts, less fearful of strangers, and less aggressive. Far from being fortuitous,
these changes in biology and behavior were closely geared to human needs in farming.
To control such beasts, humans not only branded them but devised collars, chains, prods,
and whips and also castrated and subjected certain animals to specific breeding
patterns. 42
The mechanisms for control developed along a similar timeline as animal domestication also
were implemented later for the control of humans in various forms of slavery systems, including
New World slavery. Used against humans and animals both, the whip stood as an object
commanding compliance and a metaphor separating the superior from the subordinate and the
oppressor from the oppressed.
40
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The power of the whip and the violence it perpetrated against slaves are paramount in the
slave narrative of Mary Reynolds. Reynolds, a former slave, was over 100 years old at the time
of her Works Progress Administration (WPA) interview in the 1930s. She was raised on the
Kilpatrick plantation in Black River, Louisiana. In her interview, Reynolds details observing
frequent whippings and the use of the stocks as punishment for running away or disobeying the
master or overseer’s orders. As Reynolds recounts,
Slavery was the worst days was ever seed in the world. They was things past tellin', but I
got the scars on my old body to show to this day. I seed worse than what happened to me.
I seed them put the men and women in the stock with they hands screwed down through
holes in the board and they feets tied together and they naked behinds to the world.
Solomon the the [sic] overseer beat them with a big whip and massa look on. The niggers
better not stop in the fields when they hear them yellin'. They cut the flesh most to the
bones and some they was when they taken them out of stock and put them on the beds,
they never got up again. 43
The overseer on the plantation and the one who administered the whippings was
Solomon. He was feared by the slaves more than the master of the plantation Dr. Kilpatrick. 44
According to Reynolds, “We was scart of Solomon and his whip, though, and he didn't like
frolickin.” 45 She speaks of one memory regarding his cruel nature, saying, “We'd set on the
floor and pray with our heads down low and sing low, but if Solomon heared he'd come and beat
on the wall with the stock of his whip. He'd say, ‘I'll come in there and tear the hide off you
backs.” 46 Speaking later about the despised overseer, Reynolds said, “I know that Solomon is
burnin' in hell today, and it pleasures me to know it.” 47 Throughout her time as a slave,
Reynolds had a close bond with Sara, the daughter of Dr. Kilpatrick. The girls were very close
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in age and following the death of Sara’s mother while Sara was still an infant, she was given to
Mary’s mother to nurse alongside of her own daughter. The most traumatic event of Mary’s
enslavement occurred away from the Kilpatrick plantation, after she and a slave boy named
Turner were hired out as wage hands to a man she called Kidd. After Turner ran off, according
to Mary, “Old man Kidd say I knowed bout it, and he tied my wrists together and stripped me.
He hanged me by the wrists from a limb on a tree and spraddled my legs around the trunk and
tied my feet together. Then he beat me. He beat me worser than I ever been beat before and I
faints dead away.” 48 Her injuries from the incident were so severe that when she returned home,
Dr. Kilpatrick determined that although she would survive, she would never be able to have
children. 49 For Mary and other slaves, the pain and suffering inflicted by the beatings certainly
were merciless, but the humiliation from the act produced more than just physical pain and scars:
We prays for the end of Trib'lation and the end of beatin's and for shoes that fit our feet.
We prayed that us niggers could have all we wanted to eat and special for fresh meat.
Some the old ones say we have to bear all, cause that all we can do. Some say they was
glad to the time they's dead, cause they'd rather rot in the ground than have the beatin's.
What I hated most was when they'd beat me and I didn't know what they beat me for, and
I hated they strippin' me naked as the day I was born. 50

The acts of violence committed by a master or overseer against humans and animals have been a
consistent feature throughout the institution of slavery. The depravity of such excessive violence
exhibits not only a priority for compliance to those with power, but the desire to express one’s
dominion or power over another, whether the victim be a human or nonhuman animal. These
violent acts as expressions of power are not only limited to slavery, but also often commence in
any relationship between the dominant and the submissive.
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In examining the linkage between the domestication of animals and the enslavement of
humans, Aristotle’s concept of the “natural slave” displays a perspective engrained in the
justification of enslaving humans and animals. In Politics, Aristotle maintains that as with the
male and female, there are those who cannot exist without each other and such is the case with a
natural ruler and subject, in order that both may be preserved. Aristotle writes, “For that which
can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which
can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master
and slave have the same interest.” 51 Aristotle contends that nature distinguishes certain men as
masters and others as slaves and due to this natural order, it is in the best interest and therefore
just for some human beings to be enslaved by others.
Likewise, Aristotle compares the idea of the natural slave to that of the domesticated
animal. He writes, “The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a
better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then
they are preserved.” 52 By “preserved,” he means not only that nonhuman animals and some
humans are destined for enslavement, but also that it is in their best interest to be enslaved
because slavery ensures their survival. He continues,
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and
animals, the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is,
another's and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to
have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even
apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of
tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of
life. 53
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Before elaborating on a shared model of domestication and slavery, for the purpose of
this work it must be acknowledged that Aristotle claims not only that animals and “natural
slaves” need a master, but also that women do as well. Aristotle writes, “Again, the male is by
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle,
of necessity, extends to all mankind.” 54 His most significant claim regarding the inferiority of
women as natural slaves was that their best interest is served by having a master.
Davis pointedly refers to Aristotle’s idea of the “natural slave,” when he claims that
human slavery, at least to some degree, was modeled after animal domestication. The best
evidence for this in New World slave practices is that a sort of neoteny (a genetic change in the
slave, similar to the genetic change from wild animal to domesticated animal) was the goal for
many slaveholders. 55 Davis finds another linkage between the domestication of animals and
slavery through the process of domestication; likewise, the human slaves coming to America
were no longer free and autonomous individuals, but property under the control of another
person. Once considered property, both the slave and the animal became an instrument or
extension of their master. 56 Like any other instrument that can be utilized in accordance with its
owner’s wishes, both human and animal slaves become extensions of their master.
No symbol solidifies the linkages between human and animal slavery more than the
image of the slave ship. According to Spiegel, “Only about fifteen million of some thirty or
forty million black Africans survived the ordeal of capture and transport to become slaves in the
Western Hemisphere.” 57 Many lost their lives on a cargo ship on their journey to America in
what came to be known as the “Middle Passage.”
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In perhaps the most comprehensive work ever compiled on the Atlantic Slave Trade,
Hugh Thomas establishes 1440 to 1870 as the time period for the slave trade. 58 According to
Thomas, “The Atlantic Slave Trade was, for much of its long life, a governmental enterprise in
countries concerned. . . . The main trading nations also created privileged companies concerned
to carry slaves from Africa to the New World.” 59 The majority of slaves arriving in the New
World were transported through the “Middle Passage” as part of the triangular trade. Thomas
writes,
The typical slave voyage is assumed to have been triangular. That geometric figure is
supposed to have been emblematic of its special character. But there were many
exceptions, such as the journeys made directly between Brazil and Angola. There were
also numerous direct voyages between the English North American colonies and Africa
in the late eighteenth century, and similar journeys later still between Cuba and Africa. . .
. Still, the classic journey, probably responsible for three-quarters of all voyages, was one
which began in Europe, picked up slaves in Africa in exchange for European
manufacturers, carried the slaves to the Americas, and then returned to Europe with
certain tropical American goods which slaves would probably have helped harvest. 60

The slave ship epitomized the voyage through the Middle Passage and the extreme
suffering and death by the captive passengers within its walls position this vessel of oppression
alongside the slaughterhouse and Nazi gas chamber. The Reverend Robert Walsh, in an 1829
account, describes the conditions of a slave ship after its voyage to the Americas. According to
his account, the ship had departed from the coast of Africa carrying 336 males and 226 females
onboard, the trek lasted seventeen days during which time fifty-five had been thrown
overboard. 61 The slaves were positioned beneath the deck, under grated hatchways. According
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to Walsh’s account, “The space was so low that they sat between each other's legs and stowed so
close together that there was no possibility of their lying down or at all changing their position. .
. .they were all branded like sheep with the owners’ marks of different forms.” 62 On their
condition upon arrival, Walsh writes, “Some, however, hung down their heads in apparently
hopeless dejection; some were greatly emaciated, and some, particularly children, seemed
dying.” 63 Walsh writes about the conditions, calling the heat and odor below deck, “so offensive
that it was quite impossible to enter them, even had there been room.” 64 But of all the deplorable
elements of what Walsh witnessed, he writes, “the circumstance which struck us most forcibly
was how it was possible for such a number of human beings to exist, packed up and wedged
together as tight as they could cram.” 65 Walsh details that the slaves were separated into two
compartments: 226 women shared a space of 288 square feet and 336 men fit into a space of 800
square feet. 66 When the grates were opened, Walsh writes, “It is impossible to conceive the
effect of this eruption—517 fellow creatures of all ages and sexes, some children, some adults,
some old men and women, all in a state of total nudity, scrambling out together to taste the
luxury of a little fresh air and water.” 67 The degree of suffering Walsh had witnessed was never
more apparent than when water was finally brought on board for the enslaved passengers.
According to his account,
After enjoying for a short time the unusual luxury of air, some water was brought; it was
then that the extent of their sufferings was exposed in a fearful manner. They all rushed
like maniacs towards it. No entreaties or threats or blows could restrain them; they
shrieked and struggled and fought with one another for a drop of this precious liquid, as if
they grew rabid at the sight of it. . . . I was informed by my friends, who had passed so
62
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long a time on the coast of Africa and visited so many ships, that this was one of the best
they had seen. 68

The images of such tremendous suffering depicted in Walsh’s account might seem
inconceivable today, but such conditions are still very much a part of present-day American
society. The difference now is that the victim has changed. According to Spiegel, “Today it is
common to call such a ship a ‘cattle boat’, just as Jews and others were transported to
concentration camps in what have been frequently referred to as ‘cattle cars.” 69 The reason for
this is that within the factory farming industry, animals are enduring very similar conditions,
including cramped and confined living spaces, unnatural and unsanitary
environments, transportation in overcrowded vehicles, and travel of sometimes great distances in
extreme temperatures. Like the black human slaves in America, whom white society deemed of
such a lowly status that they could be designated as property, nonhuman animals continue to
occupy a similar lowly position. These sentient beings are entrenched in a cruel and unjust
system of oppression and violence that in its extremity can only be compared in American
history and culture only to the institution of human slavery. The comparisons between the two
are not just relevant, but necessary, as an ominous reminder of the tyrannical realities of human
dominion.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FUSED OPPRESSION

Ultimately women, who often find themselves in muted dialogue with the dominant
culture, become the source for insights in the oppression of animals.
-Carol Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat

During meetings held between abolitionist newspaper editor Horace Greeley and early
feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Amelia Bloomer, and Susan B. Anthony, the
group toasted “Women’s Rights and vegetarianism.” 1 Although early American feminism and
abolitionism historically were interwoven, scholars often refuse (or fail) to include animals
rights—or animal welfare—in the discourse of abolitionism and feminism. In fact, animal rights
and traditional humanistic social justice are often oppositional, especially in marginal human
groups attempting to escape the connotations of being non-rational or of occupying a lowly
status similar to that of animals. However, as I have contended throughout this work, there are
profound linkages among the oppression of animals, black humans, and women in Western
culture. Moreover, the oppression of one group is often contingent on the oppression of the other.
In her monumental work The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol Adams develops a feministvegetarian critical theory that fuses the oppression of women with the oppression of animals by
focusing on societal mechanisms used to justify and disguise a long history of speciesism and
sexism within the patriarchal West. Adams centers the objectification of women and animals in
a modern context, by exploring the linkages among the marginalization, isolation, and
exploitation of animals and of women; she notes their linkage within a patriarchal culture that
1

Steven Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge: Perseus Publishing, 2002),
17.

89

promotes the consumption of dead animal flesh. Two points of significance are Adams’s
discussion of the absent referent, which is a fixture of oppressive language, and the idea of
dismemberment, both contributors to the oppressive property of isolation outlined in Chapter 2.
The concept of the absent referent recognizes that language can promote the dominant
culture’s ideology or belief system through making the true meaning of a term absent by
replacing it with something different altogether. 2 According to Adams, “Our concern is with the
objectification of consumption through language, so that meat’s true meaning is cast out. Behind
every meat meal is an absence, the death of the animal whose place the meat takes. With the
word ‘meat’ the truth about this death is absent.” 3 The absent referent upholds the oppression of
animals, women, and persons of color. The linkages among these groups occur because of their
places outside of the dominant culture Where their subordination (or oppression) becomes
manifest by the language of the white male patriarchy. Within a patriarchal society, Adams
contends, “language is male-centered and human-oriented.” 4 According to the author, “When
we use the adjective ‘male,’. . . we all assume that it is referring solely to human males. Besides
the human oriented notions that accompany our use of words such as male and female, we use
the word ‘animal’ as though it did not refer to human beings, as though we too are not animals.” 5
Further, patriarchal language elevates the pronoun “he” above “she” and objectifies the
animal as “it.” The male pronoun is dominant over the female pronoun in that “he” can be used
interchangeably and specifically in the place of “she,” but labeling the animal as “it,” lowers
his/her status to that of an object. 6 What this means is that “he” is the major power, “she” is a
minor power, but “it” is powerless. And as Adams mentions, “it” refers to the inanimate, or
2
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simply, that which is not alive. 7 The status of both female humans and non-human animals falls
below that of male humans, with animals at the lowest level in a hierarchy of species and gender
as evidenced by human language. Adams sees the structure of human language and the
treatment of animals as interchangeable and consistent in their oppressive tendencies. According
to Adams,
Our culture generally accepts animals’ oppression and finds nothing ethically or
politically disturbing about the exploitation of animals for the benefit of people. Hence
our language is structured to convey this acceptance. We live in a culture that has
institutionalized the oppression of animals on at least two levels: in the formal structures
such as slaughterhouses, meat markets, zoos, laboratories, and circuses, and through our
language. 8

A racial linkage also characterizes the language of oppression. Many animal caretakers
refer to themselves as masters or owners of the animals with whom they share a life. Adams
acknowledges that engaging in this type of language links to the practice of human slavery. 9
However, in reference to the previous chapter, if human slavery was indeed modeled after animal
domestication, than the use of the word master, in common with use of the whip or prod, more
than likely originated first with the animal.
In a patriarchal society, language fuses the oppressions of those with lesser statuses
within the dominant culture. 10 This union in turn implicitly links women with animals and each
to any group outside the dominant culture reflected in the language of oppression. Although
language may reflect a fused oppression between women and animals, patriarchal language also
can be used to refer to anyone outside the dominant culture. One example of this is the usage of
the term “bitch,” specifically when referring directly to a female human. Patriarchal culture has
7
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adopted the term as language used to reflect oppression, but also the bastardization of “bitch”
reflects poorly on the animal. “Bitch” always carries with it a very negative connotation,
regardless of the context in which it is used. Similarly, the term “beast” or “beastly” often refer
to indigenous populations and people of color assumed to be less than human, or animalistic.
Given the history of the word’s usage, referring to humans or animals as “beast” represents
diminishing of both their statuses. In both word usages (“bitch” and “beast”), humans presume
the lesser status of animals, but the oppression of animals, too, can be indicated by their taking
on the “inferior status” of women. 11 Animals take the “inferior status” of women when labeled
the minor power of “she.” Adams claims that animals who are being hunted are often referred to
as she, a minor power and vanquished power, because “she” is about to be killed by the hunter. 12
She expounds on this idea in discussing the work of French linguist André Joly,
As Joly points out, “sportsmen will often speak of a hare and a fish as she.” He
continues: “In fact, she has acquired a very special function in Modern English: it is
expressly used to refer to an animal regarded as a minor power…Sportsmen, whalers,
fisherman are in special relation to the animal. Whatever its size or strength, it is
regarded as a potential prey, a power that has to be destroyed—for sport or food—hence
a dominated power.” She represents not only a minor power, but a vanquished power, a
soon-to-be-killed powerless animal. Male animals become symbolically female,
representing the violated victim of male violence. 13

A fused oppression emphasizes circumstances where language is reflective of the
oppression of women by associating them with the inferior status of animals or the oppressed
status of animals reflects the use of language that associates them with lowly status of women.
But perhaps the greatest power implemented through humans’ use of oppressive language and
the absent referent is the ability of words to mask the truth. In reiterating Adams’s discussion of
11
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the term “meat,” what is true is being masked, hidden by language. The power of masking the
truth through language stands as a tool to isolate the marginal and keep them in a position of
submissiveness. Language has the power to oppress, control, and mask the truth, but it also has
the ability to liberate. As Adams discusses, language also bestows the power to name.
According to the author, “Vegetarians reform inadequate language by coining new words.
Through new naming, vegetarians apply principles that demand that the existing relationship
between human beings and the other animals be changed.” 14 The naming of vegetarian signaled
a monumental moment in a historical fight against the killing of animals. 15 What naming can
really provide is the correction of language by unmasking the truth, in relinquishing the absent
referent.
Although utilizing language to obscure the consumption of dead animal flesh,
dismemberment of the animal body also helps hide the truth of what humans consume. The
dismemberment of the animal body reinforces, or rather encourages, the use of an absent
referent. According to Adams,
After being butchered, fragmented body parts are often renamed to obscure the fact that
these were once animals. After death, cows become roast beef, steak, hamburger; pigs
become pork, bacon, sausage. Since objects are possessions they cannot have
possessions; thus, we say “leg of lamb” not a “lamb’s leg,” “chicken wings” not a
“chicken’s wings. 16

Adams alludes to an interesting idea, especially in connecting the shared oppression between
women and animals. The most notable aspect of dismemberment or fragmentation is that the
process further objectifies animals and allows language to mask the dismembered parts by
further removing the identity of the animal, but dismemberment like language, also exemplifies a
14
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fused oppression with women. How is it, then, that women share in this fused oppression? In
the literal sense, violence against women fuses this connection. As Adams discusses, women
who are raped often express feeling like a piece of meat during the encounter. 17 Dismembered
animals become objectified to meet the desires of humans through consumption, thus reinforcing
human dominion over the nonhuman animal. Moreover, rape deems woman a sexual object,
which, in turn, reinforces the domination of man. Dismemberment changes the animal from that
which is living and breathing to segmented objects (e.g., loin, rib, chuck, round). Women, too,
are fragmented through a metaphorical sexual dismembering (the epitome of male domination)
with an objectified fragmentation of their bodies. 18 As the cleaver is to the dismemberment of an
animal, the camera is to the dismembering of the female body. This is true in regard to
pornography where the camera, like the cleaver, fragments the body and replaces the status of a
living human with a sexual object, with the camera metaphorically dismembering the woman
into body parts of sexual desire. 19
If dismemberment can be understood as a tool of oppression by isolating marginalized
humans and animals, then a similar linkage can be found in the dismemberment of the African
slave family unit. At slave auctions, mothers and fathers were separated from their children,
husbands from their wives, and siblings from each other. In his autobiography Twelve Years a
Slave, Solomon Northup recounts the ordeal of one mother, Eliza, being separated from her
children after mother and children were all sold to different masters. The first of her children
sold was her young son Randall. Northup writes, “All the time the trade was going on, Eliza was
crying aloud, and wringing her hands. She besought the man not to buy him, unless he also
bought herself and Emily. She promised, in that case, to be the most faithful slave that ever
17
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lived.” 20 Her pleas would be of no avail as her son was sold. When the exchange was finalized,
“Eliza ran to him; embraced him passionately; kissed him again and again; told him to remember
her— all the while her tears falling in the boy's face like rain.” 21 After a few days had passed,
Eliza and her young daughter Emily were separated next. Northup recounts the tragic event,
writing,
It would be a relief if I could consistently pass over in silence the scene that now ensued.
It recalls memories more mournful and affecting than any language can portray. I have
seen mothers kissing for the last time the faces of their dead offspring; I have seen them
looking down into the grave, as the earth fell with a dull sound upon their coffins, hiding
them from their eyes forever; but never have I seen such an exhibition of intense,
unmeasured, and unbounded grief, as when Eliza was parted from her child. She broke
from her place in the line of women, and rushing down where Emily was standing,
caught her in her arms. The child, sensible of some impending danger, instinctively
fastened her hands around her mother's neck, and nestled her little head upon her bosom.
Freeman sternly ordered her to be quiet, but she did not heed him. He caught her by the
arm and pulled her rudely, but she only clung the closer to the child. Then, with a volley
of great oaths, he struck her such a heartless blow, that she staggered backward, and was
like to fall. . . .”Mercy, mercy, master!” she cried, falling on her knees. “Please, master,
buy Emily. I can never work any if she is taken from me: I will die.” When Eliza heard
Freeman's determination not to part with Emily, she became absolutely frantic. . . .“I will
not go without her. They shall not take her from me,” she fairly shrieked, her shrieks
commingling with the loud and angry voice of Freeman, commanding her to be silent. . .
.finally, Freeman, out of patience, tore Emily from her mother by main force, the two
clinging to each other with all their might. . . .“Don't leave me, mama—don't leave me,”
screamed the child, as its mother was pushed harshly forward; “Don't leave me—come
back, mama,” she still cried, stretching forth her little arms imploringly. But she cried in
vain. Out of the door and into the street we were quickly hurried. Still we could hear her
calling to her mother, “Come back—don't leave me—come back, mama,” until her infant
voice grew faint and still more faint, and gradually died away as distance intervened, and
finally was wholly lost. 22
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Although the family unit for slaves empowered them through providing a sense of solidarity,
love, and kinship, the fracture of the slave family was a form of dismemberment. By severing
the familial bonds of slaves, masters kept them in a marginal, powerless, and inferior position.
The dismemberment of the slave family also holds emphasis for slave women, in that as mothers,
little else could reduce them to a state of such incredible powerlessness as separating them from
their children, and thus dismembering them from their roles as mothers.
Adams’s discussion of the “texts of meat” provides another linkage between the
oppression of women and animals. The texts of meat stand as a cultural text that members of
society adhere to due to the recognizable message “meat” conveys in a patriarchal society. 23
According to Adams, “The texts of meat which we assimilate into our lives include the
expectation that people should eat animals and that meat is good for you.” 24 The endurance of
the texts of meat is reflective in society’s attitudes, propagated through imagery and conditioned
through what is accepted as normal, whether this be the enslavement of blacks, the oppression of
women, or the eating of animal flesh. The cultural text of meat is also gendered, perceived in the
relationship between meat and virility. 25 This relationship has been so engrained in the West that
it has become a part of the American cultural DNA. Members of society are indoctrinated in the
texts of meat from birth and the vast majority sees meat as a part of the American identity and a
prominent aspect of their way of life. For most western humans, this explains their reluctance to
give up flesh eating or to form an oppositional opinion regarding the status of animals. For
women residing in a patriarchal society, opposition to the texts of meat is not only an opposition
to meat eating, but also opposition to the dominant culture. It could be the case that the
vegetarianism of writers represents opposition to the dominant culture and thus literary critics are
23
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prone to ignore such opposition According to Adams, “Why is the vegetarian aspect to a writer
or her work often ignored by literary critics? I struck upon the idea of the texts of meat to answer
these questions. By speaking of the texts of meat we situate the production of meat’s meaning
within a political-cultural context. None of us chooses the meanings that constitute the texts of
meat, we adhere to them.” 26
Although Adams contends that flesh eating fuses the oppression of women and animals,
men, and even many women, remain enmeshed in the texts of meat. As proponents of equal
status of all humans, feminists, by all accounts, should be opposed to flesh eating and the texts of
meat, yet most are not. If women are to rise to the status of men, perhaps they see similar eating
habits as an elevation within the patriarchal hierarchy. Yet, as Adams offers in her feministvegetarian critical theory, feminism and vegetarianism/veganism go hand in hand as a
consequence of the fused oppressions of animals and women in patriarchal societies.
To explicate the fused oppression of women, blacks, and animals in American culture,
the parallels drawn in instances of violence against women and, consequently, in man’s desire to
dominate nature, should be highlighted as significant features in a non-discriminatory culture of
oppression. According to Carolyn Merchant in her work Earthcare: Women and the
Environment, “We must reexamine the formation of a world view and a science that, by
reconceptualizing reality as a machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination
of both nature and women.” 27 Merchant contends that nature was fashioned by Western scholars
as female through two historical perspectives. In the first perspective, nature appears as mother,
relating to “a kindly beneficent female who provided for the needs of mankind in an ordered,
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planned universe.” 28 This interpretation conveys the familiar usage of “Mother Nature.” The
second idea constitutes an opposing perspective, in that nature is wild, chaotic, violent, and
uncontrollable. 29 Both perspectives of nature, however, are associated as female. The metaphor
of nature as a kind and nurturing mother, according to Merchant, “gradually vanished as a
dominant image as the Scientific Revolution proceeded to mechanize and to rationalize the world
view.” 30 The perception of nature as wild and uncontrollable rationalized white men’s
domination of nature, and with it, women, blacks, indigenous peoples, animals, all assumed to be
wild and needing someone to control them. 31
The association between women and nature ultimately link to the powerlessness of
women and animals within the dominant white, patriarchal culture. As Josephine Donovan
contends “The anomalous and the powerless include women and animals, both of whose
subjectivities and realities are erased or converted into manipulable objects—‘the material of
subjugation’—at the mercy of the rationalist manipulator, whose self-worth is established by the
fact that he thus subdues his environment.” 32 As “the material of subjugation” within capitalist
societies, women’s production is devalued. Donovan explains, “Their labor has prepared
material for immediate use by the household rather than for use as a commodity for exchange or
for monetary payment.” 33 Capitalism has essentially objectified women, as it has black humans
and animals. As with nonhuman animals and slaves, such objectification has led to women’s
susceptibility to violence, their historical domesticity (being confined to the home to keep house
and raise children), and their place outside of the dominant group. The early American feminists
28
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had it right in toasting women’s rights and vegetarianism, wherein they recognized a connection
between the two that has remained for well over a century. Because women share their
oppression in many regards with that of animals, as was the case in the push for abolition, it
seems women will once again carry the torch towards animal liberation.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: HUMANS, ANIMALS, AND SHARING THE SHADOW

We require now to extend the great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity over the lives of
animals. Let animal slavery join human slavery in the graveyard of the past.
-Norm Phelps, Changing the Game: Why the Battle
for Animal Liberation Is So Hard and How We Can
Win It

In 1990, Smithfield Foods began construction on a 973,000 square-foot slaughterhouse in
Bladen County, North Carolina, in a small town known as Tar Heel. Ten years later the site
stands as the final stop for 38,000 pigs every day and nine million each year. In his book An
American Trilogy, Steven Wise traces the history of oppression at a small site that originally was
the home of Native Americans until they were driven off by white settlers. Later, the site was
occupied by a large slave plantation. Today, the location is home to a large Smithfield
slaughterhouse and factory pig farm. 1 Wise writes, “Today we acknowledge that our genocide
of Native Americans was wrong. . . .we agree that we were wrong to enslave millions of blacks
and to mistreat them after they became free. Today global climate change and other catastrophes
we continue to cause are leading us to a new understanding of how to act toward all of God’s
creation—including the pigs of Bladen County.” 2 If the history of a little town in North Carolina
can teach us anything, it is that within the shadows of dominion have resided human and
nonhuman animals alike.
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A central focus of this work has been on examining the human—animal divide and the
ideologies that have contributed to anthropocentric beliefs and attitudes. Anthropocentrism has
been engrained in the history of Western philosophy, effectively relegating nonhuman animals to
a footnote in the discourse of the human experience and upholding the divide between that which
is called human and that which is called animal. The anthropocentric quality of Western thought
has been interwoven in the fabric of Western society and remains a prominent component in
justifying the exploitation, oppression, and enslavement of animals through societal customs and
institutions such as the factory farm, hunting, and vivisection.
The ideas about community (kinship) and capacities encourage anthropocentrism, but
they are also vital in establishing an ethic for treatment of animals. Because humans analyze the
moral status of animals based on their own conception of the human self, anthropocentrism
seems inherent to the animal rights/welfare discourse. Postmodern conceptions of the animal
have confronted anthropocentrism but postmodernists continue to be guilty of a similar
anthropocentric habit. In Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, Steiner writes,
The confrontation between the liberal humanist and Romantic conceptions of animals
poses a central problem for contemporary environmental ethics: The tension between
human self-assertion and the sense that we are part of a larger cosmic whole seems
irreducible; and yet as long as this tension remains unresolved, the moral status of
animals will remain critically problematic. . . . The confrontation between the liberal and
Romantic conceptions reflects a profound ambivalence between two seemingly
incommensurable ways of conceiving of value: one that makes human valuations the
source of all value, and another according to which value has a cosmic source that
transcends human experience. 3

The conflict between human morality and the conception of the nonhuman animal forces
anthropocentrism, even if moral theory focuses on inclusion, rather than exclusion, of the
nonhuman animal. It seems that the anthropocentric tendencies of moral theory are a limit of
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Western philosophy that cannot be remedied. Although postmodern thinkers such as Derrida
attempted to establish a kinship between human and nonhuman animals on the basis of a shared
environment, all animals interpret their environment differently. 4 Heidegger contends that
nonhuman animals are limited in what they can do within their environment or at least limited in
comparison to humans. He writes, “They are limited by language and limited by their lack of
richness in comparison to humans in how they can perceive their environment.” 5 But how can
humans know that animals cannot perceive their environment as do humans? Assuming that
humans could know, it is an anthropocentric assumption supposing to know what life is like for
nonhuman animals. According to Steiner, “Beyond acknowledging that animals possess their
own kind of subjectivity, we may ultimately never be in a position to answer Thomas Nagel’s
question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ One might even say that ‘we cannot really image [sic]
what [the animal’s] world looks like without reverting to anthropocentrism,’ and that ‘this is our
poverty.” 6
Posthumanism stands as a discourse that moves beyond humanism and thus minimizes
the divide between human and nonhuman animals. Posthumanism essentially decenters
the human animal. 7 In What is Posthumanism? Cary Wolfe defines its meaning by linking it
with postmodernism. As Wolfe states,
My sense of posthumanism is thus analogous to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s paradoxical
rendering of the postmodern: it comes both before and after humanism: before in the
sense that it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just its
biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic coevolution of the human
animal with the technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms (such as language
4
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and culture). . . . But it comes after in the sense that posthumanism names a historical
moment in which the decentering of the human by its imbrication in technical, medical,
informatic, and economic networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical
development that points toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms, a new model
of thought that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical
protocols and evasions, of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon. 8

If a humanist discourse contributed to anthropocentric, sexist, and racist ideologies,
posthumanism transcends the distinctions that allowed the formation of these ideologies. For the
nonhuman animal, posthumanism develops a starting point that should drive humans’ ethical
response to animals, mainly, the shared presence of being, mortality, and finitude. 9
In developing a posthumanist response to the question of the animal, Derrida’s The
Animal That Therefore I Am reflects on the question of the animal in several contexts, notably,
the animal in philosophy, in history, and most prominently, within the human or the human
within the animal. The title The Animal That Therefore I Am reflects not only Derrida’s belief
about the animal—human divide, but also his belief about the absurdity of separating humans
and animals while categorizing all nonhuman animal species as the same. The title reflects the
ambiguity within the word “animal.” According to Derrida, “Back to the question of what I do
when ‘I am’ or ‘I follow’. . . if I am following this suite then, I move from ‘the ends of man,’ that
is the confines of man, to ‘the crossing of borders’ between man and animal.” 10 In his title,
Derrida acknowledges the linkage of the human animal to the nonhuman animal and expounds
on it in discussing an encounter with his cat. Derrida wrote, “I often ask myself. . .who I am—
and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an
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animal, for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble . . . overcoming my embarrassment.” 11
This encounter led him to question the subjects of his shame, the humanity and animality within
himself, and the animal that lies behind the gaze. He asks, “Ashamed of what and naked before
whom?” 12 Through this discussion Derrida sets in motion the overall focus of his work, how the
animal—human distinction is drawn.
Throughout his work, Derrida often utilizes the phrase, “that which we call animal.” This
phrasing is purposeful and is understood in his emphasis on the low status of the nonhuman
animal in Western philosophical discourse. Derrida is critical of Cartesian ideology and other
ontological perspectives that relegate the animal to a mechanical form. However, he is also
critical of rights discourse, which seeks, he contends, “homogenous continuity between what
calls itself man and what he calls the animal.” 13 Of the human-animal divide, Derrida
emphasized that a difference does exist: “To suppose that I, or anyone else for that matter, could
ignore the rupture, indeed that abyss, would mean first of all blinding oneself to such contrary
evidence.” In regard to the Cartesian and Kantian discourse, Derrida responds,
Their discourses are sound and profound, but everything in them goes on as if they
themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that
addressed them. At least everything goes on as though this troubling experience had not
been theoretically registered, supposing that it had been experienced at all, at the precise
moment when they made of the animal a theorem, something seen and not seeing. 14

Both philosophical approaches place humans in what Derrida perceives as a privileged position.
Although one approach determines that humans have qualities that animals do not (such as
language or reason) and that therefore make humans superior to nonhumans, the oppositional
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position negates the distinctiveness of each animal species (whether that be human animals,
primates, felines, insects, etc.) by seeking one trait that all or most share, such as the ability to
experience pleasure or pain. For Derrida, each species is unique and both dominant positions
that is, the Cartesian/Kantian and the rights position in philosophy discount this uniqueness.
This, Derrida contends is a limit of Western philosophy as it applies to the human and nonhuman
animal.
As Derrida explores the perceived distinctions between that which we call human and
that which we call animal, he examines Jacques Lacan’s claim that language acts as the singlemost differentiating factor between the two. Notably, Lacan contends that animals can only
react, not respond, to stimuli. 15 According to Derrida, “Lacan claims to be relying on what he
blithely calls the ‘animal kingdom’ in order to critique the current notion of ‘language as a sign’
as opposed to ‘human languages.’ When bees appear to ‘respond’ to a ‘message,’ they do not
respond but react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the
other, to the question from or of the other.” 16 Derrida relates this position to Cartesianism in the
sense that the “Cartesian animal like its descendants, would remain incapable of responding to
true questioning. For it lacks the power of real questions.” 17 He does not refute these linked
positions, but instead understands them as limits that need to be deconstructed. Derrida utilizes
Lacan’s example of bees and their perceived lack of responsiveness and contends that human
language, similar to that of the bee, seeks a response from another. According to Derrida, “For
the function of language is not to inform but to evoke.” 18 Derrida understands the similarity
through the intention of responses because language is composed of signs. Yet, Lacan
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differentiates between signs in human language and coding in animals, contending that coding is
fixed while signs in human language results from human interaction. 19 Derrida explains, “What
he (Lacan) attributes to signs that, ‘in a language’ understood as belonging to the human order,
‘take on their value from their relations to each other’ and so on, and not just from the ‘fixed
correlation’ between signs and reality, can and must be accorded to any code, animal or
human.” 20 For Derrida, language is meant to incite a response and both human and animal
“language” incite a response. A human who has ever spent any time with cats or dogs would
have to agree that whether by their gazes or other mannerisms, their intention is often to incite a
response.
Lacan’s idea on reaction and response relate to a similar concept he proposes about the
subject and the other and how both relate to language. Lacan claims that one differentiating
factor between human animals and nonhuman animals is that humans can lie. Derrida explicates
Lacan’s position: “Why do you tell me that you are going to X in order to have me believe you
are going to Y, whereas you are indeed going to X?”21 It is through this analogy posed by Lacan
that Derrida explicates Lacan’s position on animals: “According to Lacan it is that type of lie,
that deceit, and that pretense in the second degree of which the animal would be incapable,
whereas the ‘subject of the signifier,’ within the human order, would possess such a power and,
better still, would emerge as subject, instituting itself and coming to itself as subject by virtue of
this power. . .a power that is conscious of deceiving by pretending to pretend.” 22 Although
Derrida does not necessarily refute this claim, he contends that Lacan, in common with those
philosophers who came before him, adheres to a position that holds what an animal lacks is a
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lacking in and of itself, instead of something reflective of the human—animal divide. The
animal’s lack of an ability to pretend to pretend is not the animal’s lack of this ability, but what
Lacan’s subject lacks. It is what the human lacks that gives him/her dominion over animals. 23
Derrida explains,
The animal does not know evil, lying, deceit. What it lacks is precisely the lack by virtue
of which the human becomes subject of the signifier, subject subjected to the signifier.
But to be subject of the signifier is also to be a subjecting subject, a subject as master, an
active and deciding subject of the signifier, having in any case sufficient mastery to be
capable of pretending to pretend and hence being able to put into effect one’s power to
destroy the trace. This mastery is the superiority of man over the animot. 24

Derrida contends that the problem becomes the human. What gives him/her the authority to
evoke the idea that an animal is without something, when humans cannot be sure that other
humans possess it? It is this assumption, one that claims to know what is behind the gaze of a
cat, for example, which has led to the historical conception of the animal as lacking. 25 Likewise,
it is through such arrogance that animals have been subjected to such harsh realities as factory
farming.
Several themes prevail in Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am, but the entirety of
the work centers on the binary division between human and animals and how philosophers and
other scholars have interpreted these distinctions. Through his “limitrophy,” Derrida coins the
term “animot” as a substitute for the term animal. Marie-Louise Mallet’s foreword to the work
expresses Derrida’s concern for the violence perpetrated against animals and his inception and
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use of animot to underline the “extreme diversity of animals that ‘the animal’ erases, and which,
when written, makes it plain that this word ‘the animal’ is precisely only a word.” 26
Steiner, in common with Derrida, questions, “How are we to realize a sense of belonging
together with animals in the whole of nature, without committing the Jacobin excesses of a
romanticism that sacrifices the individual for the (supposed) good of the whole?”27 It seems that
this choice of belonging (or not) with animals in the whole of nature would call for the
abandonment of moral theory altogether or at least the development of a theory that would
attribute to humans and animals an equal moral value. Even in developing a new theory, would
humans not be guilty of interpreting the nonhuman animal experience from what they value in an
ethical obligation to animals?
Steiner maintains that “If we abandon theory, we are forced to rely too much on intuitions
that are susceptible to subjective viewpoints and acculturation.” 28 But with each ethical
approach another problem arises for the nonhuman animal: “The rights approach privileges those
beings most capable of asserting their own rights. Utilitarianism makes the pleasures and pains
of more sentient beings count more in the social calculus. And appeals to kinship threaten to
place creatures such as oysters, which lack even a central nervous system and hence the capacity
for any cognition or sentience, on a moral par with human beings.” 29 Steiner’s solution is an
approach that confirms the unique qualities of human animals but does not give humanity an
“absolute priority” over nonhuman animals. 30 The merger of anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics results when approaches seek to resolve the difficulties of the human—
animal divide while maintaining the significance of capacities and kinship. According to
26
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Steiner, “A balance or harmony between the liberal and holistic approaches on the side of ethics
corresponds to the harmony between capacities and kinship approaches that I propose on the side
of ethology. The two sides of this project are linked by the endeavor to do justice to animals
without losing sight of those qualities that are distinctively human.” 31 As Steiner contends,
They (nonhuman animals) can fare well or ill, regardless of whether they are
‘subjectively aware’ of their fortunes, and regardless of how much their awareness
resembles our own. In this respect, invertebrates such as bees are like many other
creatures, from dogs and cats to apes and monkeys to human beings. It is here that the
capacities and kinship views meet: Capacities are not confined to capacities for subjective
awareness but include capacities for growth and flourishing. Beings with either of these
sorts of capacities have a fundamental kinship with human beings. On the basis of this
complementary conception of capacities and kinship, the doctrine of belonging
(oikeiosis) could be reconceived so as to constitute a sphere of kinship among all beings
that struggle for life and well-being. 32
Yet, the oppression of nonhuman animals continues today to such an extent that it can be
appreciated only through a comparison to the most extreme historical episodes of human
suffering. These appraisals are not only necessary in recognizing the abhorrent practices that
continue today against the oppressed, but also are paramount in abandoning the trans-historical
conception of the animal as significantly inferior to human animals. If we, as humans, can
progress past our purely anthropocentric perspectives, maybe then our shared struggles for life,
the finiteness of the human and animal body, and the vulnerability that lies at the very core of
every being will abide as the greatest unifying trait between that which we call human and that
which we call animal.
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AFTERWORD
Having been raised in the foothills of the Great Smoky Mountains in East Tennessee, the
culture and environment of the area profoundly shaped my actions, interests, and beliefs from a
young age. My parents, holding deep ties to the region, were products of a similar cultural text
that they passed to their children. For me this meant a Christian indoctrination, an ideology of
what is right and wrong, normal and abnormal. This cultural text encouraged conformity to
southern Christian culture while disparaging difference, and it elevated my father over my
mother, my white neighbors over my black ones, and of course humans over animals.
Ever since I was old enough to hold a fishing rod or squeeze the trigger of a shotgun, my
father brought me with him to fish and hunt. I remember killing my first dove and skinning my
first rabbit, and I can still recall the excitement I felt when my father told me I was finally old
enough to go deer hunting. In our garage, my family kept a large freezer stocked all year with
venison, flesh from deer killed by my father or uncle. In our home meat was a staple and I
believed a meal was incomplete without it. My beliefs as a child echoed the beliefs of my
parents and the majority of the people in our small southern community. I resided in an area of
immense natural beauty and wildlife, where hunting and fishing were cultural traditions, just like
any other hobby or sport. It was not until I was older that I realized my rationalization for
hunting was false. This rejection of a years-long practice stemmed from an episode I
experienced while dove hunting.
Coming upon a shot dove I was instructed to retrieve, I discovered the fallen animal lying
wounded, but alive. The buckshot had torn through the bird’s wing just missing vital tissue. The
common practice for hunters who confronted a wounded bird is to break the animal’s neck to end
its life. But as the small creature lay helpless on the ground before me, it was then that I realized
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the error of my ways, the falsity of my indoctrination, and the wrongness of a traditional practice
that I always considered innocent. At the time, I was unfamiliar with ethics, had never stepped
foot into a college classroom, and was unaware that at that very instance millions of animals
across the world were suffering as a consequence of human dominion, just as the dove laying
before me.
Animals within the factory farming industry, those locked in cages awaiting painful
experimentation, and animals hunted and killed, and all are hidden away in the shadows of
human dominion. Before we can truly liberate animals and fight to end their suffering, the
shadows under which they suffer must be pushed away. I believe revealing the immense
suffering inflicted on animals across various practices is paramount to affect change. To some
extent, all people are blinded by their own cultural indoctrination and socialization, which, at
least in part, is responsible for obscuring many of the moral wrongs committed by human
animals. We rarely view our consumption of meat, our purchase of certain products, or our
“normal” practices such as hunting as contributing to animal suffering. It is because of this false
perception of normality that informing the consumer of the horrors of hunting, vivisection, and
intensive farming practices, among other cruel and unnecessary evils we inflict on animals,
becomes the catalyst to begin alleviating centuries of wrongdoing. It is essential that humans
witness the anemic veal calf crying for his mother, the pregnant sow confined to such degree that
she is unable to turn around in her crate, the beagle in the laboratory used for cosmetic testing
who has never felt the warmth of the sun, the circus elephant whose scars detail a lifetime of
abuse, or the dove wounded by gun fire who will never again fly alongside her lifetime mate. It
is imperative that we see the violence, pain, and suffering our way of life inflicts on others. Only
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then will we as humans truly see what resides in the shadows of our own dominion and begin our
transition from oppressor to liberator.
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